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The Civil Law Enforcement of Contractual Covenants
ALLEN P. K. KFxsEE*
1. INTRODUCTnON
A standard component of virtually all international loan agree-
ments is the package of "negative covenants" to which the lender
requires the borrower to obligate itself. Typically, these covenants
require the borrower not to merge, liquidate, file for receivership or
bankruptcy, cease doing business, enter new lines of business, en-
cumber any of its assets, or in any way dispose of any substantial
portion of them, execute cross-guaranties, make loans to third parties,
incur long-term debt in excess of specified amounts or enter into long-
term leases, management agreements, or profit-sharing arrangements.'
' Counsel, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,
Yale University, 1968; J.D., Harvard University, 1972; Associate, Simpson,
Thacher, and Bartlett, New York, 1972-1975; General Editor, COMMERCL4L
LAws OF THE MIDDLE EAST, Oceana Publications, 1980.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Lie. Luis A. Carballo,
Bufete Pacheco Coto, San Jose, Costa Rica, for his explanations of how Costa
Rican courts have interpreted and implemented certain of the Code sections
cited herein and for taking the time to review and comment upon the finished
manuscript. The author would also like to thank Lie. M. Casimiro for her in-
sights and extensive commentary.
1. The various restrictions explored in this article can be found in the stan-
dard project loan agreement forms used by the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International
Finance Corporation and Citibank, N.A., among others.
While the substance of the restrictions is essentially the same in each of
the four standard forms cited, it is interesting to note the variations of language,
degree of detail, and attempted completeness among the forms in use by the
four institutions. The following paragraphs represent, in part, the respective
sections forbidding encumbrance of borrower assets:(I) Citibank: So long as any debt under this facility shall remain
unpaid Borrower(s) will not without the prior written consent of
Lender... mortgage, pledge or in any way encumber any of its assets
except for purchase money liens on equipment purchased and [other
specified liens].
(II) Eximbank: Until all of the indebtedness under this Agreement
and the Notes has been paid in full, the Borrower covenants and
agrees that, except as the Lenders may otherwise consent in writing,
it will not . . . create or permit the creation (except as required by
the Guarantor as a condition of issuing its guarantee in this Agreement)
of any mortgage, pledge, lien, or other encumbrance, on any of its
properties, whether now owned or hereafter acquired ...
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It is this body of covenants in particular, which, granting the difficulty
of drafting against the random hazards presented by management
fallibility and the vagaries of the marketplace, seeks to at least pre-
clude the borrower from purposefully engaging in any course of action
which could impair its earnings capability or divert its revenues into
third party "pockets" inaccessible to the lender. It is because of this
prophylactic, as opposed to remedial, orientation that negative cove-
nants can justly be regarded as the most important loan documenta-
tion component in the post-disbursement phase of a financing-more
important than even financial reporting provisions (essentially "post
mortem" devices) and collateral security arrangements (essentially
"last resort" remedies).
Negative covenants assume particularly great importance in trans-
national, as opposed to uni-jurisdictional, loan transactions. This is
so not simply because the quantum of risks varies as between domestic
(III) IFC: Unless IFC shall otherwise agree, the Company shall
not:
(g) Create or permit to exist any lien on any assets of the Com-
pany except:
(i) the liens to be created as security for any indebtedness in-
cluded in the Financial Plan but only if such lien or liens
shall secure pro rata, under agreements in form and sub-
stance satisfactory to IFC, the Loan and any other indebt-
edness hereunder;
(ii) any tax or other statutory lien, provided that such lien
shall be discharged within thirty days after final adjudica-
tion; and
(iii) any lien on commercial goods to secure a debt, incurred
in the ordinary course of business, maturing not more than
one year after the date on which it is originally incurred
and to be paid out of the proceeds of sale of such com-
mercial goods.
(IV) OPIC: The Company shall not directly or indirectly create,
assume or permit to exist any mortgage or lien on, vendor's lien or title
retention agreement with respect to, or other security interest in, any
property or assets of or contracted to be sold to the Company whether
now owned (or leased) or hereafter acquired (or leased), or in any
proceeds, income or profits therefrom, provided that the foregoing
restrictions shall not apply to:
(a) Liens for taxes and assessments which are not otherwise re-
quired to be paid by the terms of this agreement; and
(b) Contractual or statutory liens terminating prior to the date of
completion of project construction in favor of equipment suppliers
and materialmen in only the goods sold by them for the Project to
secure only the purchase price thereof, and in favor of contractors
and mechanics in only the facilities for the Project constructed by
them to secure only payments and fees for such construction services.
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and international investments (a differential which should be reflected
in the lender's pricing formulation), but primarily because the type
of lending risk encountered in the international arena differs materially
from that encountered in domestic financings. In domestic investment
situations, for example, the principal sources of uncertainty are argu-
ably the relatively familiar marketplace and competitive model risks-
both controllable, at least in theory, by careful borrower selection.
The international lender, per contra, is often concerned with the sub-
stantial physical and cultural distances that separate lender and bor-
rower, by the political uncertainties inherent in cross-border financing,
and perhaps most importantly, by the lender's ultimate dependence
on an at best unfamiliar, and at worst hostile, legal system as the
instrument of enforcement of its contractual rights. Under these
circumstances, where care in borrower selection clearly must be re-
inforced by vigilance in asset control, negative covenants assume a
heightened importance.
This importance is recognized, in a sense, by the virtually invari-
able inclusion of covenant violations as an event of default. Yet, in
the process of negotiating and drafting the terms of foreign investment
financings, the means of enforcement of negative covenants are rarely
adjusted or structured to meet the specific requirements of the par-
ticular financing to be effected. Similarly, they rarely reflect the de-
mands of the jurisdiction where the loan documentation will have to
be enforced. On the contrary, it appears that negative covenant en-
forcement mechanisms are generally perbeived as static, assumed
"givens," rather than as dynamic "variables" similar to mandatory
prepayment triggers, financial tests, and collateralization options.
The mechanism that lenders based in common law jurisdictions
appear to look to in the final analysis for enforcement of their nega-
tive covenants is the threat to institute actions against the borrower
for injunctive relief and/or damages. In some cases, lenders may also
rely on actions against the other party to the violative transaction for
interference with contractual rights. Generally, the options of actual
acceleration, action on the debt, and foreclosure are regarded as last
resort measures which ideally will not have to be utilized.
Such an approach might be acceptable outside common law juris-
dictions if all enforcement jurisdictions were governed by those same
substantive and procedural legal principles which obtain in the lend-
er's common law jurisdiction and which are reflected in its loan docu-
mentation. In actuality, however, the common law holds sway in a
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relatively small number of nations as compared to -the number of
countries which, as detailed in Part II of this paper, have adopted
what may justifiably be referred to as the leading legal system in the
world, the civil law system. 2 In that civil law principles are not
2. The origins and distinguishing characteristics of the civil law system
have been described thusly by three leading commentators:
If we leave aside the great systems of Hindu and Islamic law, the
modem world may be divided into two broad groups of legal systems-
the common-law countries which comprise the English-speaking world
and territories which have formed part of the British Empire and
Commonwealth; and the civilian countries which include continental
Europe and many other-even Oriental-states which have, with
westernisation, adopted occidental codes of law, like Japan and Turkey.
To a greater or less degree, civilian systems stem from Roman law; or
rather from revived Roman law.
For Roman law, in world history, had two leases of life and in-
fluence. In the first, of course, it was the living law of Rome and
the Roman Empire, an existence which may be said finally to have
come to an end with the compilation by the Emperor Justinian (A.D.
527-565) of the Code and Digest which contain the essential legacy
of the imperial legislation and juristic writing respectively of Rome's
past. Its second life began with the use and study of Justinian's works
in the Italian universities of the eleventh century A.D., which spread
thereafter throughout Europe (even, to an extent, into medieval Eng-
land), influencing the development of juridical terminology to the
period of codification, which really starts with the French Code Napo-
leon of A.D. 1804.
J. THOMAS, Roman Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEcAL SYSTEMS 1 (J. Derrett
ed. 1968).
A [major world legal system] to which French law belongs may be
called the Roman-Germanic family. This group includes those coun-
tries in which legal science has developed on the basis of Roman
Law ....
The law has evolved, primarily for historical reasons, as an essen-
tially private law, as a means of regulating the private relationships
between individual citizens; later other branches of law were developed,
but less perfectly, according to the principles of de droit civl which
today still remains the main branch of legal science .... The Roman-
Germanic family of law originated in Europe. It was formed by the
efforts of the European universities which, from the 12th century and
on the basis of the compilations of the Emperor Justinian evolved and
developed a juridical science common to all and adapted to the con-
ditions of the modem world.
R. DAvro & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE Wom.D TODAY 14 (1968).
Two points of difference are usually emphasized in comparing the
civil and the common laws. First, in the civil law, large areas of private
law are codified. Codification is not typical of the common law.
Second, the civil law was strongly and variously influenced by the
Roman law. The Roman influence on the common law was far less
profound and in no way pervasive.
A. VON MEMEN & J. GOrILEY, THE CivIL LAw SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1977).
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identical with common law principles, there would appear to be a
prima facie question as to whether lender reliance on common law
covenant enforcement mechanisms in civil law jurisdictions is advisable.
Starting from the premises discussed in Parts III and IV that
underlying legal principles are substantially similar in the many civil
law jurisdictions around the world and that it is reasonable to repre-
sent them by one well-chosen "model" civil law jurisdiction, this paper
argues, in Part V, that the common law jurisdiction approach of at-
tempting to prevent negative covenant violations through the deter-
rent effect of the threat of litigation is an ineffective approach in civil
law jurisdictions. Part V, for example, lays major emphasis upon: (1)
the difficulties of invoking injunctive relief or of bringing damage
actions for breach of contract; (2) the fact that in a civil law jurisdic-
tion the lender's threat to litigate is in essence little more than the
threat to invoke the ultimate remedies of acceleration, suit on the
debt (or possibly bankruptcy), or foreclosure; (3) the fact that the
pursuit of these remedies is hardly consistent with the lender's pay-
back interest since it places the lender in the position of being able
to enforce its negative covenants only by the exercise of prerogatives
which cause the firm serious operational-and probably financial-dis-
ruption, i.e., precisely the effect the occurrence of which the covenants
were intended to preclude; and (4) the fact that such a result seriously
undermines the credibility of litigation as a deterrent to covenant
violations. Part VI then describes in detail four enforcement mecha-
nisms of proven effectiveness in civil law jurisdictions, and provides
summary accounts of civil law principles fundamental to the operation
of these mechanisms.
Finally, it should be noted that implicit in the foregoing analysis
is the premise that given the large number of nations which are civil
law jurisdictions, the common law-based lender who does not make
some attempt to adopt its loan documentation by the incorporation
of effective covenant enforcement mechanisms is taking a serious risk
that the most vital post-disbursement feature of its documentation-
the negative covenants-will be all but unenforceable, a condition
which can only have the most adverse implications for repayment
prospects.
II. TnE Civr LAw AND = ConEs NAPoLEoN
Two points should be made at the outset. First, there is ample
reason for a common law attorney to delve into civil law issues in
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view of the widespread influence of the civil law in the world today.
As previously mentioned, the number of countries classifiable as civil
jurisdictions far exceeds the number of nations in the common law
orbit. Indeed, civil law jurisdictions make up one of the four great
"families" of law in the world' and include nations comprising all of
Western Europe, except Great Britain and Ireland; all of Africa, ex-
cept Liberia and the ex-British colonies, but including Egypt; all of
Latin America; all of the Middle East, except the Arabian Peninsula
states; and Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan.4
Second, despite the great social, cultural, and political variations
among the many countrites which have adopted the civil law system,
it is eminently feasible to study civil law principles applicable to
virtually all of those countries because, generally speaking, those prin-
ciples had a common origin in-albeit indirect in some cases-and
those legal systems continued in many cases to be strongly influenced
by, the French Codes Napoleon enacted in the first decade of the
nineteenth century.5 One knowledgeable commentator has asserted
that "the French Civil Code is the most pervasive single phenomenon
of the entire world of the system known as the civil law." 6
3. R. DAVID & H. DE VBIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 14 (1958).
4. For detailed descriptions of various civil law jurisdictions, see R.
SCHLEsINGER, COMPARATrVE LAW 251-69 (3rd ed. 1970).
5. The Napoleonic Codes include the Civil Code of 1809; the Civil Pro-
cedure Code of 1806; the Commercial Code of 1807; the Penal Code of 1811;
and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1811. See generally M. AMos & F. WAL-
TON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 18 (2d. ed. 1963); David & de Vries,
supra note 3, at 13 (All subsequent references herein to the Napoleonic or
French Codes will be to the three non-criminal codes).
6. J. CRABB, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 5-6 (1977). Crabb further states:
The French Empire of Napoleon annexed outright the entire Low
Countries (the present "Benelux") and large parts of Germany, Italy
and Switzerland, to all of which the Civil Code was applied (leaving
aside from discussion transAdriatic territories known as "Illyria" that
were also annexed). In addition the Code was adopted in some client
states or protectorates, this occurring in Poland and some German
states which had not been annexed to France itself. Upon recovering
independence these countries, with minor exceptions, did not summarily
throw out the Civil Code as part of the law imposed by a foreign
conqueror under whom they had languished. Rather they seem to have
judged it on its own merits, found it superior to their earlier systems of
law, and retained it, with whatever modification they wished, as an
ongoing basis of legal system. The German and Swiss areas ultimately
did depart to join different movements of their own national laws which
subsequently resulted in each establishing its own system of codification
independently of the Napoleonic model. But otherwise the scheme of
the French Civil Code extended later into some other European countries
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A second commentator has noted, with respect to the substantial
coincidence of principles among civil code "families" and to the he-
gemony of the French codes in particular, that
[tihere is almost no private-law code in force in any civilian coun-
try today which is not substantially copied from, or in its structure
or some of its provisions to some extent influenced by the codes of
France, Germany or Switzerland. The German Civil Code of
1896 (effective date Jan. 1, 1900) was in turn somewhat, although
not too strongly, influenced by provisions of the French Code; and
the Swiss Code of 1907 . . . did not escape the influence of the
German and French codes.'
Similarly, despite the fact that the current Italian Civil and Civil
Procedure Codes were issued in 1942 and were modeled to a certain
extent on opposite-number German codes, the Italian codes are in-
disputably French in terms of underlying legal principles, in that they
represent not wholesale replacements, but merely reformations of the
Italian Civil, Commercial, and Civil Procedure Codes of 1865, which
in turn, were based squarely on the respective French Codes. More-
over, the Italian Commercial Code of 1882, which was "particularly
influential" in the legislation of Latin America and which formed the
basis for the commercial law sections of the 1942 Italian Civil Code,
was modeled, albeit with certain changes, on the French Commercial
Code of 1807.8
and areas which it had not entered at the time of the original Na-
poleonic impulse.
The Civil Code followed the French flag around the world as France
developed the bulk of its colonial empire in the nineteenth century.
These colonies upon becoming independent retained the Civil Code and
other French legal institutions as the bases of their modem legal
systems. The Civil Code has also made appearance in parts of the
world that were never touched by French sovereignty. Latin American
countries, in seeking as the basis of legal system something more
modem than the Spanish law which they had inherited, leaned heavily
on the guidance and framework of the French Civil Code. Parts of
the Arab world which had experienced British rather than French
colonialism, after achieving independence constructed their modem
legal systems on French models rather than to continue with law
based on English style. Non-European societies which were never
subjected to European colonialism ultimately replaced their traditional
legal systems with modem law, and in so doing in varying degrees
borrowed, adapted or at least studied the French Civil Code.
Id.
7. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 383-84.
8. M. CArPELLETTI, J. MFRIYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE IT.L.tN LEGAL SYS-
TEM 46-47 (1967). "Both the French and German codifications . . . have
strongly influenced the legal development of unified Italy." Id. at 52.
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With respect to Latin America, the French Commercial Code of
1807, with minor amendments, including the incorporation of the
"Ordinances of Bilbao," became the Spanish Commercial Code of
1829,' and in that form, was copied widely throughout Latin America.'
The influence of the French Civil Code throughout the area has also
been pervasive. 1 Similarly,
throughout the vast area of North and West Africa as well as the
Near East (except in Turkey [, ] Israel [, Saudi Arabia and South
Yemen]) French influence has been stronger than that of any other
legal system .... In the [Middle East,] especially in the law of
obligations and in the area of commercial law, civil law influence-
traditionally of the French variety-has become predominant.
French influence remains particularly strong in Lebanon and Iran
. . . [W]hile the Code Napoleon is no longer blindly followed, it
is still the most potent source of western influence upon draftsmen
of private law codes in the Arab world.12
9. B. KOZOLCHYK & 0. TORREALBA, CuRso DE DERECHO MERCANTH, 106
(1974).
10. "It is generally acknowledged that the Latin American countries took
their codes from the French." Gutierrez, El Desarrollo de un Systema Juridico,
5 REViSTA JuDiciAL 65 (1977) (quoting E. NovoA, EL DERECHO COMO On-
STACULO AIL CAMBIO SOCIAL 18 (1975)).
11. Limpens, Territorial Expansion of the Code, in Tim CODE NAPOLEON
AND THE COMMON LAw WORLD 92 (B. Schwartz ed. 1956). Note particularly
Limpens' comments on the legal systems of Chile and Argentina, both of whose
Codes and jurisprudence have been, and remain, highly influential throughout
Latin America:
[With respect] to Latin America, we find that the codes developed there
during the nineteenth century were all more or less inspired by the
French example.
The Dominican Republic Code of 1825 and the Bolivian Code of
1831 were copied virtually verbatim from the French Code. The ...
Chilean Code of 1865 established by the great jurist Arches Bello,
. . . in spite of its incontestable originality, also belonged to the
French family. Its arrangement is practically the same and many
passages are literally borrowed from the French Code. This code was
. . . so remarkable that it was copied by some countries (Ecuador and
Colombia, 1861 and 1873 respectively) and taken as a model in others
(Uruguay and Argentina, 1867 and 1869).
As for the Argentinian Code of 1869 . . . , a threefold source is gen-
erally attributed to it: the Escobo of Freytas for the first three books,
Aubry and Rau and the Code Napoleon for the last three, [and] Garcia
Goyenna and the Chilean Code for the remainder. As much directly
as indirectly (through the Chilean conduit), the French influence is
here again important if not preponderant. Id. at 99-100.
12. ScuLrEswcER, supra note 2, at 262-63. See also A. LIEBEsNy, THE LAw
OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 71-116 (1975). "In the former French North
African territories, the influence of French law has been profound." Id. at 111.
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Finally, it should be noted that virtually all of the nations of former
French West Africa have either retained in force the French codes in
effect on their respective dates of independence, or have replaced
those codes with modernized versions differing from their French
predecessors in organization and text, but remaining conceptually true
to their original counterpart.1"
In assessing the full significance of the shared Napoleonic origin
of virtually all civil law systems, it should also be recognized that
in the civil law, although prior decisions and judgments are not, as a
rule, ignored by judges in subsequent cases, the principle of stare
decisis is not formally recognized. Prior case law and legal precedent
are considerably less important than in the common law. Rather,
the prime evaluative standards applied to the facts of a given civil
law case and invoked as the basis of the "reasoned" judgment re-
quired by virtually all civil law procedure codes are the principles set
forth in the codes themselves. It can reasonably be argued that by
virtue of their common origins and the relative infrequency of code
revisions, these codified principles tend to correlate more from country
to country than do principles derived from case law, which principles
are free to permute in each discrete common law jurisdiction in which-
ever directions the courts choose to take them. This greater con-
sistency of legal principles across civil law, as opposed to common
law, boundaries then, combined with the common origin of the civil
law codes cited above, makes it reasonable to contend that the study of
"civil law principles" in general constitutes in fact the study of the
legal principles basic to scores of nations around the world.
III. METHODOLOGY, MODELING AND CORRELATIONS
Precisely because such a multiplicity of civil law jurisdictions does
exist, it is not practical to attempt to review each country's codified
and statutory provisions as they bear on negative covenant enforce-
ment and to provide precise country-specific remedial formulations.
Rather, the approach to be taken in this paper is: (1) to attempt to
demonstrate that in addition to the common origin of code principles
noted in Part II, there is, even today, a substantial correspondence
among civil law jurisdictions of underlying legal principals in general,
and of principles in the negative covenant area specifically; (2) to
select one civil law jurisdiction and establish that it is indeed repre-
13. See J. SALACUSE, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA
121 (1969) (discussing the law of the Ivory Coast).
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sentative of civil law systems in general; and (3) to base the
discussion of specific covenant enforcement problems and specific
solutions on the codes and statutes of that model jurisdiction.
The threshold question, then, is whether "modeling" is legitimate
at all, no matter how apt the model, when the legal systems of a wide
variety of disparate nations are the items to which the model is being
applied. A defensible answer is that where the legal systems sought
to be represented are the civil law systems descended from the Na-
poleonic Codes, the exercise is reasonable. This conclusion can be
defended not only by reference to the common origin of the code
systems of civil law nations described above, but also to the high
degree of correlation among the underlying legal principles subsisting
today in the respective codes of civil law nations. This correlation
appears to obtain whether the civil code system in question developed
directly from the French model or indirectly from the French codes
via German or Swiss models.
This linkage of underlying principles is perhaps most effectively
illustrated by presenting examples from the civil, commercial, and
civil procedure codes of three nations widely disparate in culture,
language, geography, and colonial experience: Costa Rica, the Ivory
Coast, and Thailand. These nations have virtually nothing in com-
mon other than the origin of their respective civil, commercial, and
procedural codes. The similarities of both code language and under-
lying principle which will be noted in this comparative analysis,
however, should support the validity of the modeling technique.
Costa Rica
The first code enacted in Costa Rica was the General Code of
1841, which included sub-codes on penal, procedural, and civil law
matters. 4 The Code's origins have been described as follows:
The Civil Code was, for the most part copied from the French
[although in] some areas it departed from the original, such as, for
example, in matters of marriage and divorce, where principles of
common law were adopted, and in matters of testamentary suc-
cession, where Spanish law was followed.15
14. Gutierrez, supra note 10, at 65.
15. A. CORDOBA, HISTORIA DEL DERECnO 380-81 (1929). See also F. ActTNA,
HISTOIA DEL DERECHO 225 (1978). "The first part [of the General Code],
the civil code, has its roots in the French Code." Id.
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The Civil Code currently in force in Costa Rica was issued in 1887
and took effect on January 1, 1888. Like its predecessor, it was based
on the Napoleonic Civil Code and the analyses thereof published by
the well-known French commentators Aubry and Rau.16
Per contra, the procedural provisions of the General Code were
based on the Spanish Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, which in turn
reflected not French, but rather "medieval Spanish procedures." "
Through extensive revision during the late 1800's, in 1933, and most
recently in 1937, however, the Civil Procedure Code has evolved into
a code which in its trial, attachment, execution, and appeals procedures,
as well as in its summary proceedings provisions, closely resembles
the French procedure code.
The first Costa Rican Commercial Code was promulgated in
1853 and was a direct copy of the Spanish Commercial Code of 1829,
which, in turn, was a minimally-altered adaptation of the French
Commercial Code of 1807. The Code has since been amended, e.g.,
by the bankruptcy laws of 1865 and 1907, the bill of exchange law
of 1902, and various legislation relating to the organization of
sociedades anonimas, sales by merchants, and banking practices. In-
deed, in 1964, an entirely new edition was promulgated. Nevertheless,
only minimal changes in principle or concept, as opposed to organiza-
tion and operational detail, have been effected from the original 1853
edition."'
Ivory Coast
The Ivory Coast, upon its independence in 1960, retained in force
the civil, commercial, and civil procedure codes applicable on that
date to La France Outre-Mer (French-administered territories be-
yond the borders of metropolitan France). These codes were es-
sentially identical to the codes then in force in France proper, except
for the colonial codes' non-inclusion of the amendments to French
bankruptcy law effected by the French law of May 20, 1955.0 In
1972, the Ivory Coast enacted a new Civil Procedure Code2 o not
markedly different from the amended version of the French Pro-
cedure Code of 1806 which had theretofore been in effect.
16. Acufia, supra note 15, at 227.
17. Id. at 225.
18. Kozolchyk & Torrealba, supra note 9, at 106; Acufia, supra note 15,
at 229.
19. Salacuse, supra note 13, at 118.
20. Loi No. 72-833, du 21 decembre 1972.
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Thailand
The crelevant codes currently in force in Thailand are the Civil
and Commercial Code, the first two books of which were issued in
1925 and which was completed in 1935, and the Civil Procedure
Code B.E. 2477, issued in 1935. Both codes draw upon German,
Swiss, and Japanese models, as well as on the French codes, 1 but the
codification commission's chief draftsman, M. Rene Guyon, was
French, 2  and its attorneys were almost all French and Belgian.3
Perhaps in consequence of these staffing factors, while Thai civil
procedure, both in matters of evidence and of conduct of litigation,
closely parallels English civil procedure, the Thai Civil and Com-
mercial Code, except in its omission of the traditional French
"merchant/non-merchant" bifurcation and in certain aspects of bank-
ruptcy law, does not deviate markedly from its counterpart French
codes in terms of underlying legal principles. 24
Comparative Correlations
While the degrees of correlation among the three above code
systems vary, each of them exhibits a marked linkage to the other
systems in virtually all areas of major commercial importance.
As a consequence of a shared, relatively direct descent from
the French Civil, Commercial, and Civil Procedure Codes, the re-
spective codes of Costa Rica and the Ivory Coast exhibit substan-
tial correlation in commercial matters. For example, Costa Rican
Commercial Code Articles 727, 800, and 803 ,25 on the one hand, and
21. Hicking, The Legal System of Thailand, 2 HoNG KONG; L.J. 10 (1972).
22. Id. at 9.
23. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, COUNTRY LAW STUDY FOR THAILAND 6 (1971).
24. See also Kraichitti, The Legal System in Thailand, 7 WAsHBURN L.J.
239, 241 (1968).
[E]xcept in certain branches of Thai law such as bills of exchange
and bankruptcy, where English influence was and is still strong, Thai-
land for its general law reform turned to the continental tradition of
codification in which the leading principles of Roman jurisprudence
prevailed in logical form and with scientific arrangement.
Id. at 241.
25. Quotations from the Costa Rican codes are the author's translations
from the following Spanish-language editions: CoDico CVM [C. CIv.] (A.
Vincenzi ed. 1978); CoIco DE COMMERCIO [C. COM.] (N. Valle & H. Zurcher
eds. 1978); and CODICO DE PROCEDIWIENTOS CIVILES [C. PR. CIV.] (A. Vincenzi
ed. 1976).
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Ivorian Commercial Code Sections 110 and 183,20 together with
Article 1 of the Decree of October 31, 1935, setting forth the formal
requirements for bills, notes, and checks, respectively, are virtually
identical. To take one illustration, Article 727 prescribes that a valid
bill of exchange must state on its face: (a) its denomination as a bill
of exchange; (b) an unconditional order to pay a sum certain; (c)
the name of the drawee; (d) the due date; (e) the place of payment;
(f) the name of the payee; (g) the bill's date and place of issue; and
(h) the signature of the drawer. Section 110 sets forth identical
requirements, virtually verbatim.
In the important area of basic contract law, there are numerous
code sections which are close parallels. Compare, for example, Costa
Rica Civil Code Article 629 and Ivorian Civil Code Section 1101.
Article 629 states:
An obligation has for its object to give, to do or to refrain from
doing something, and may refer to all things which are traded in
commerce including future interests, such as in crops not yet grown.
Section 1101 states:
A contract is an agreement by which one or several persons
obligate themselves to one or several other persons to give, to do
or not to do something.
Costa Rica Civil Code Article 627 and Ivorian Civil Code Section
1108 contain virtually identical provisions. Article 627 states:
In order to be valid, an obligation [must include] the following
essential [elements]:
1. capacity of those who contract;
2. as an object, a thing certain and possible which serves as
the subject matter of the obligation; and
3. just cause.
Section 1108 states:
Four conditions are essential to the validity of an agreement:
1. the consent of the party who obligates himself;
2. his capacity to contract;
3. a definite object which forms the subject matter of the obliga-
tion; and
4. a licit cause for the obligation.
26. See generally CODE CIVrL, JUrIs CLASSEUR DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE MEn
(1948); CODE DE COMMERCE, JU.IS CLASSEUn DE LA FRANCE D'OuTrE MER.
(1948).
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Other examples of the close correlation among the provisions of the
respective Costa Rican and Ivorian codes are Costa Rica Civil Code
Article 633 and 700 and Ivorian Civil Code Sections 1234 and 1142.
These provisions state respectively, in notably similar language, the
principle that any nonperformance is remedial in damages, and also
articulate the means through which obligations are extinguished.
A number of commercially significant provisions appear in
virtually identical language not only in the Costa Rican and Ivorian
codes, but also in the Thai codes.27 Examples, which again are far
from a complete list of such correlations, are the Thai Civil and Com-
mercial Code sections which, respectively: (i) define the formal
requirements of bills, notes, and checks; 28 (ii) set forth permissible
forms of business organizations; 2 and (iii) impose joint and unlimited
liability on any limited partner who participates in the management
of a limited partnership. 0
Similarly, there are correlations limited to Costa Rica-Thailand,"1
and others found only between Ivorian and Thai code provisions."
In any event, while all civil, commercial, and civil procedure codes
will differ from each other to one degree or another," and while it is
27. THE CIVIL AND COMMRxCIAL CODE B.E. 2468 (Int'l Trans. Center ed.,
Bangkok) (hereinafter cited as Thai Civ. AND COM. C.).
28. Thai Civ. AND CoM. C. §§ 909, 983, 988 (correlating to the Costa
Rican articles and Ivorian sections cited above).
29. Thai Civ. AND COM. C. §§ 1013, 1064 (correlating to Costa Rica C.
CoM. art. 17 and Ivory Coast CoM. C. § 19).
30. Thai CIv. AND COM. C. § 1088 (correlating to Costa Rica C. COM.
art. 65 and Ivory Coast CoM. C. 99 27, 28).
31. For example, Costa Rica C. COM. art. 34 states: "Agreements by which
the unlimited joint and several responsibilities of the partners are eliminated or
reduced are absolutely void and shall have no legal effect in prejudice of third
parties." Thai Civ. AND COM. C. § 1053 states: "No restriction of the power
of a member of a non-registered partnership to bind the other partners can
have effect with respect to third persons."
32. The prime example here is the substantial correlation between Ivory
Coast Civ. C. §§ 1582 et seq. and §§ 453 et seq., which set forth the rules of
the respective jurisdictions governing contracts of sale. Compare Costa Rica C.
Civ. arts. 1603 and 1605 with Thai Civ. AN CoM. C. §§ 461, 472, and 486
(stating, respectively, the duties of seller and buyer).
33. There is a notable lack of correlation, for example, among the thrbe
jurisdictions' bankruptcy provisions (Costa Rica C. CoM. art. 1831 et seq.; Ivory
Coast CoM. C. §§ 437 et seq.; and Thai Bankruptcy Act B.E. § 2483) and
execution procedures (Costa Rica C. Civ. art. 424 provides for the juicio ejecu-
tivo, or summary proceeding, in the case of execution based on certain "execu-
tory documents," and, analogously, Ivory Coast CIV. PR. C. § 334 provides that
all orders, judgments, and actes authentiques may form the basis of execution
provided that they bear the executory formula, that is, a clause, described in
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not a certainty that negative covenant enforcement mechanisms that
work in one civil law jurisdiction will work in all others, the substantial
correlation between Costa Rican codes, on the one hand, and the
codes of two other civil law jurisdictions-the Ivory Coast and Thai-
land, chosen essentially at random-does suggest that such mechanisms
as are effective in Costa Rica would, in all probability, be effective in
a substantial number of other civil law jurisdictions also.
Several independent analytical procedures tend to confirm this
conclusion and establish that the same legal principles which are
basic to the enforcement procedures described in Part VI are indeed
intrinsic to the codes of other civil law jurisdictions. First, a review
of the Thai and Ivorian codes discloses that the correlation with the
Costa Rica codes in the commercial law areas discussed above ex-
tends to the principles of law most relevant to covenant enforcement.
As will be detailed in Parts V and VI, below, prominent among these
enforcement-related principles are: (a) relative lack of capacity as
a basis for the voidability of juristic acts; (b) the availability of the
so-called accion pauliana for attacking transactions inimical to creditor
interests; and (c) the application and effect of the liquidated damages,
or penalty, clause.34  Second, correspondence and memoranda re-
ceived from attorneys in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicara-
gua, and Panama indicate that the same difficulties of attempting to
deter covenant violation by the threat of litigation would rise, and
that the same civil law-oriented enforcement mechanisms would be
effective, in those five jurisdictions as in Costa Rica.m Third, the
correlation noted above among the Costa Rican, Ivorian, and Thai
codes on enforcement mechanism principles has been found to extend
to the codes of two other major civil law jurisdictions chosen for re-
Civ. PR. C. § 259, which may be inscribed upon the executory copies of court
judgments or actes en la forme authentique (a category that includes all docu-
ments drawn up in notarial form); contra, Thai Civ. PR. C. arts. 253 et seq.
and 271 et seq. (relating to pre- and post-judgment execution; emphasizes
not particular categories of "executory" documents, but rather the showing by
the applicant of a need to conserve obligor property and his possession of a
valid order or judgment).
34. See discussion infra. Correlation with each of these concepts is found:
(a) with respect to lack of capacity among Costa Rica C. Civ. art. 836, Ivory
Coast Civ. C. §§ 1108 and 1989, and Thai Crv. aND COM. C. §§ 823 and 1164;
(b) with respect to the accion pauliana, among Costa Rica C. Cxv. art. 848,
Ivory Coast Civ. C. § 1167, and Thai Cxv. AND COM. C. §§ 237-240; and (c)
with respect to the penalty clause, Costa Rica C. CoM. arts. 426-28, Ivory Coast
Cxv. C. §§ 1226-33, and Thai Civ. aND CoM. §§ 379-83.
35. Correspondence and memoranda in author's files.
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view on an essentially "spot-check," or random, basis-Egypt and
Spain." There appears, then, a reasonable basis for concluding that
the negative covenant enforcement mechanisms discussed with respect
to Costa Rica would be effective in a substantial number of other civil
law jurisdictions.
IV. Tim COSTA RicA MoDEL
Costa Rica is the model jurisdiction to be used to illustrate the
implementation of the civil law enforcement mechanisms for two
primary reasons. First, the enforcement mechanisms under con-
sideration were initially developed and applied in connection with
two actual loan workout 7 and restructuring situations which occurred
in Costa Rica during 1978 and 1979. Hence, it is certain that with re-
spect to Costa Rica, the enforcement mechanisms described are valid
and effective. The second basis for reliance on Costa Rica as a model
is that in several important respects, Costa Rica is better qualified
than a number of other nations as an apt representative of the "typical"
civil law jurisdiction. For example, the codes currently in force in
Costa Rica are not mere copies of the Napoleonic Codes, but rather
are what may be termed "third generation" codes-the reformed,
revised, and indigenized descendants of received Spanish codes which
were themselves permutations from the French originals. Thus, the
Costa Rican codes do not represent an atypically "pure" or "turnkey"
version of the Napoleonic Codes, as do, for example, those of the
Dominican Republic or even France itself, but rather represent a
typically "indigenized" variant of the original French codes.
Moreover, Costa Rica qualifies as a model jurisdiction by the
very fact that its codes were derived from the French, rather than the
German, side of the civil law family. The French Codes, as noted
above, not only antedate the German codes, but have been more
36. PERROTT, FARMER & SIMS MARSHALL, THE EGYPTIAN CIVIL CODE (Cairo
1952); and S. WALTON & N. DE LEON, THE SPANISH CIvIL CODE (Havana 1899).
With respect, for example, to: (a) relative lack of capacity as a basis for contract
voidability, see Egyptian Civil Code Articles, 105, 141, and Spanish Civil Code
Article 1259; (b) the availability of the accion pauliana, see Egyptian Civil Code
Articles 5, 104, and Spanish Civil Code Articles 1291 (3), 1292, 1298; (c) to
the penalty or liquidated damages clause, see Egyptian Civil Code Article 223
and Spanish Civil Code Article 1152.
37. The term "work-out" refers to the process of negotiation, payback re-
scheduling, and in most cases, allocations of collateral engaged in by, on the
one hand, a borrower (together with its guarantors and/or affiliates, if any) who
has defaulted under a loan agreement, and on the other hand, its (their) creditor.
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widely received by other nations. Costa Rica's French-inspired codes,
thus, have more in common with the codes of that large block of Latin
American, Middle Eastern, and ex-French/Belgian African nations
whose legal systems were primarily influenced by the Napoleonic
Codes, than do the codes of such nations as Switzerland, Greece,
Turkey, South Korea, and Japan, the codes of which were more
heavily influenced by the German codes.8
Finally, despite the fact that the major influence on the Costa
Rican codes has been indisputably French, the current Costa Rica
Commercial Code does reflect the influence of the Italian Civil Code
of 1942 and the German Commercial Code of 1900.1' Hence, con-
clusions based on an analysis of Costa Rican law should have sub-
stantial validity even for German- and Italian-influenced jurisdictions.
V. Thi ENFOnc. m'rr PROBLEM
As givens, then, are the importance of negative covenants, the
substantial number of nations which subscribe to civil law principles,
the pervasive influence of the French codes in, and the consequent
high degree of correlation among, the codes in force in the various
civil law jurisdictions, and the probable applicability of enforcement
mechanisms effective in Costa Rica in a substantial number of other
civil law jurisdictions. It remains to be demonstrated precisely why
the "litigation deterrent" relied upon for covenant enforcement in
common law jurisdictions is an ineffective enforcement mechanism in
civil law countries. The following section will, therefore, discuss in
detail four principal factors which render common law negative
covenant enforcement procedures ineffective in civil law jurisdictions
and which necessitate the development of covenant enforcement
mechanisms specifically adapted to civil law systems.
Injunction versus Embargo
The first enforcement problem arises from the fact that the laws
of Costa Rica, taken as representative of civil law statutes in general,
do not provide for injunctive relief. That is, whereas in a common
law jurisdiction, if a lender learned of a borrower's intent to grant a
38. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 260, 384.
39. Interview with H. Zurcher, principal code draftsman. For a description
of the development of the German commercial code, see von Mehren, supra
note 2, at 73-74, and of codified Italian commercial law, see Cappelletti, supra
note 8, at 222-28. Note that the Italian Civil Code of 1942 was the successor
to both the Civil Code of 1865 and the Commercial Code of 1882.
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mortgage, execute a cross-guaranty, merge, dispose of assets, or take
on excessive additional debt, it could, if such an act were barred by
the lender's negative covenants, move a court to enjoin the borrower
from violating its contractual obligations.40  This remedy is not, how-
ever, available under Costa Rican law. There, the best one can do is
to threaten to attach, or "embargo," borrower property if a prospective
covenant violation is actually effected or an existing violation not
cured.
Under Civil Procedure Code Article 172,"1 a creditor may be
granted pre-judgment (or "conservatory") attachment (an embargo
preventivo) of his debtor's assets on a showing that such action is
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw §§ 6301, 6312, and 6313 (MeKinney).
§ 6301 states in part:
Grounds for preliminary injunction may be granted in any action
where it appears that the defendant threatens or is about to do, or is
doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in violation of the
plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual, or in any action where the plaintiff
has demanded and would be entitled to a judgment restraining the de-
fendant from the commission or continuance of an act, which, if com-
mitted or continued during the pendency of the action, would produce
injury to the plaintiff. A temporary restraining order may be granted
pending a hearing for a preliminary injunction where it appears that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result unless the
defendant is restrained before the hearing can be had.
§ 6312 states:
Motion papers; undertaking ... (b) Undertaking. Except as pro-
vided in section 2512, prior to the granting of a preliminary injunction,
the plaintiff shall give an undertaking in an amount to be fixed by the
court, that the plaintiff, if it is finally determined that he was not en-
titled to an injunction, will pay to the defendant all damages and costs
which may be sustained by reason of the injunction ....
6313 states:
Temporary restraining order. (a) Generally. If, on a motion for a
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff shall show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss or damages will result unless the defendant is
restrained before a hearing can be had, a temporary restraining order
may be granted without notice. Upon granting a temporary restraining
order, the court shall set the hearing for the preliminary injunction at
the earliest possible time .... (c) Undertaking. Prior to the granting
of a temporary restraining order the court may, in its discretion, re-
quire the plaintiff to give an undertaking in an amount to be fixed by
the court, containing terms similar to those set forth in subdivision
(b) of rule 6312, and subject to the exception set forth therein.
41. C. Pa. Civ., art. 172 states: "In order to prevent the debtor from hiding
or embezzling his property and nullifying thereby the result of any action, the
creditor may demand conservatory attachment."
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necessary to ensure that any ultimate judgment the creditor may obtain
can be satisfied. The disadvantage of the embargo is that it is not a
direct constraint on borrower action, as would be a judicial order to
refrain from violating a particular negative covenant. Rather, it is
only a prospective constraint, a threat to in future obtain an order for
the sale of the attached property if the violation is carried through
or not cured. Although, in theory, the attachment threat should carry
some weight, in practice, it is of little value for two particular reasons.
First, most debtor assets of any value will already have been mortgaged
to collateralize the lender's loan. Second, in order to obtain even
partial repayment from attachment proceeds, the lender would be
compelled to sell the mortgaged or attached assets at auction, thereby
incurring the risk of disruption of the borrower's operations and
earnings capability. The necessity of running this risk can operate
as a substantial disincentive to actual lender use of the embargo
remedy-a fact of life of which most civil law jurisdiction borrowers
are far from unaware.
Attachment is also available on a post-judgment basis 2 but,
again, is of little use to the creditor. Unless the debtor deposits
security for the amount due, 3 the embargoed property is sold at
auction,4 with proceeds to the judgment creditor. The creditor, as
noted above, however, is already likely to have a forecloseable lien
on any borrower property of value and, again, is unlikely to be en-
thusiastic about attempting to enforce negative covenants through
potentially costly suits leading to borrower property sales likely to be
disruptive of borrower operations, detrimental to borrower credit
standing with suppliers, and altogether negative in its impact on
borrower repayment capabilities.
Cost Factors
A second constraint on lender efforts to achieve covenant enforce-
ment through the threat of litigation is the cost of obtaining an em-
42. C. PR. Cirv., art. 437 states: "If the plaintiff establishes his personal
capacity and if the document he files is executory, the judge decrees execution
and orders the attachment of property in sufficient amount to cover the sum
payable plus fifty percent for interest and costs."
43. C. PR. Civ., art. 449.
44. C. PR. Crv., art. 465 states:
If the order of auction is agreed to by the parties or judicially con-
firmed, or if in its place a surety for its results is given, then if the
attached property is money, the claimed principle, interest, and costs
shall immediately be paid to the plaintiff.
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bargo preventivo or of instituting any other litigation whose deterrent
effect the lender would normally look to for covenant enforcement
under a common law regime. The high cost of instituting litigation
stems from: (i) the fact that the plaintiff may be required to post
indemnification and court cost bonds, unless he is entitled to bring
his action as a summary proceeding; and (ii) the requirement of
paying substantial legal fees, whether or not the action is brought
on a summary basis.
Article 425 of the Civil Procedure Code lists by category a series
of executory instruments (titulos ejecutivos) which are deemed to
embody explicit and unconditional payment obligations. Prominent
in the executory document category are notes, all duly drawn public
documents, 8 court judgments,47 and mortgages.48
45. C. PR. Crv., art. 425 states:
Execution will not be ordered except on the basis of executory in-
struments. Executory instruments are:
1. A court order for execution of a judgment;
2. The certified copy of a public writing duly issued, or, as the case
may be, a certification, which the Public Registrar's office is obliged
to provide of such copy or whose registration is pending;
3. The certification of an entry in the Public Registry, provided that
it is stated therein that the certified inscriptions have not been can-
celled or modified by any other entry;
4. A private document acknowledged before a competent judicial
authority, or declared as acknowledged, in default of appearance by
the party;
5. A confession of judgment made by a party or which is made by the
court in the absence of such party;
6. Certification of non-appealable orders or judgments which establish
against a third person or against a party the obligation to pay a sun
certain, where such obligation does not arise from the same action as
the action to enforce;
7. Any type of document to which specific legislation accords executory
force.
46. A public document is defined by C. Civ., art. 733 as follows:
A public writing is an instrument granted before a notary public.
It is effective without witnesses, whether inscribed in a protocol book or
in certified copies or certifications, unless the law provides to the con-
trary or one of the parties so requests or it is deemed necessary or
convenient, in which case the number of witnesses shall not be more
than two, provided that the law does not provide otherwise.
The notary must be legally authorized to exercise his functions, in accord-
ance with the relevant law.
The witnesses must be adults, be of good reputation, know how to read and
write and be under no legal impediment.
47. C. Pi. Cxv., art. 425.
48. Id.
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The primary benefit of evidencing an obligation by a titulo
ejecutivo is that, subject to one exceptional circumstance to be
discussed below, any action brought on the basis of such a document is
entitled to be adjudicated by a summary proceeding, or juicio
ejecutivo. The summary procedures provided by a juicio ejecutivo
include: (i) the limitation of the period allowed the defendant to
answer and to compile his evidence to a total of ten days, versus
fifteen to thirty days in an ordinary procedure, or juicio ordinario;
and (ii) the limitation of the period for the presentation of evidence
to the same period as provided for evidence compilation, versus an
additional ten days for answer and specification of evidence, and up
to forty more days for the presentation of evidence in an ordinary
action.49
The juicio ordinario is not only more time consuming than the
juicio efecutivo, but entails for the creditor, if he requests the im-
position of an embargo preventivo, the obligation to post a bond to
guarantee the respondent against any damages the latter may suffer
by reason of an attachment which is deemed in the hearing on the
merits to have been unjustified. The amount of the bond is set at
either twenty percent (cash) or fifty percent (securities) of the value
for which the embargo is sought.50 The creditor, moreover, is re-
quired to file his action on the merits within thirty days after the
effective date of the embargo.5' If he fails to do so, the embargo is
lifted and his bond is forfeited.52 If the creditor does proceed with
the action on the merits within the prescribed time limit, he may be
ordered, unless he is suing on the basis of an executory instrument,
to post an additional twenty-five percent of the value of his action
49. C. Pa. Civ., arts. 231, 290, 440, and 441.
50. C. Pia. Civ., art. 173 states:
If the creditor does not file an executory document, he must guaranty
direct and consequential damages resulting from the attachment and
specify clearly what type of satisfaction he demands from the defendant
and the cause or instrument on which his claim is based. The guaranty
must consist of the deposit of cash or securities, as ordered by the judge.
If in cash, the deposit must be twenty percent of the amount for which
the attachment is sought [and] if in securities, fifty percent....
51. C. Pa. Civ., art. 175.
52. C. Pa. Civ., art. 176 states:
If the claim on the merits is not presented within the prescribed
term, or is dismissed by a non-appealable judgment, the attachment is
lifted and the applicant is required to pay direct and indirect damages.
In both cases the deposit of the money made by the applicant will be
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to guarantee payment of certain litigation expenses, including court
costs and the respondent's counsel's fees.5'
The damages guaranty will only be returned to the creditor upon
the institution of the suit on the merits if the action is based on an
executory document; if not so grounded, the deposit is retained by
the court. In toto, then, the cost of attaching debtor property and
suing on the merits on the basis of a non-executory instrument can
theoretically range from twenty to seventy-five percent. While the
latter amount is rarely, if ever, exacted in practice, even damage
and cost bonds which together total twenty to twenty-five percent
of the value of the action are sufficiently high, especially in view of
the relative difficulty, resulting from the non-observance of a stare
decisis rule and the characteristic lack of detailed fact exposition in
judgments, of predicting the outcome of civil law litigation, to give
pause to all plaintiffs except those with the greatest confidence in their
claims.
One may reasonably ask why, since a lender would presumably
always require its debtor to execute a titulo ejecutivo as evidence of
the obligation concerned, it would ever be necessary to forego the
juicio ejecutivo. The answer is that even if the operative document
falls in one of the six titulo ejecutivo categories prescribed by Ar-
ticle 425, the debtor may still be able to argue that certain of the
document's terms render it non-executory. If the court accepts this
argument, the document's enforceability must be determined through
an ordinary proceeding. This prospect has disturbing implications
in the covenant enforcement area.
Violation of a negative covenant which is a term of an executory
document will assuredly be actionable in summary proceedings if no
more is needed to establish the violation than proof of the occurrence
forfeited at once to the owner of the attached property as liquidated
damages, but this in no way diminishes the right of the injured party
to demand the balance of the actual damages caused by the attachment.
53. C. Pn. Civ., art. 192 states:
The applicant as well as the respondent has the right to demand,
reciprocally, the guaranty of costs in order to assure the payment of
any which may be taxed [to the other party]. This rule is applicable
to all types of actions, except actions which are executive or universal.
The guaranty of costs shall be 25% of the estimated amount set forth
in the claim .... If the applicant has obtained a conservatory attach-
ment in order to guaranty the results of the action, it is within the dis-
cretion of the judge to exempt the defendant from the guaranty or
reduce its amount.
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of an easily verifiable breach. Such breaches would include, for
example, the unauthorized grant of a mortgage or pledge, the execu-
tion of a cross-guaranty, or the execution of a loan agreement or
lease in excess of covenant-stipulated maximums. The greater the
degree, however, to which establishing the fact of a covenant violation
entails proof of the infringement of an essentially subjective standard-
i.e., whether a transfer by the borrower involved "substantially all,"
or a "substantial portion of," its assets, or whether a lease on an operat-
ing, supply, management, or profit-sharing agreement is "within the
ordinary course of business"-the greater the risk that recourse to the
juicio ejecutivo may be foreclosed by a borrower claim that a fact
issue exists as to whether the standard in question was indeed in-
fringed. If the borrower succeeds in his claim, the lender-even if
his action is based upon a document which would otherwise be
executory-will be required to proceed via a juicio ordinario. Hence,
for certain covenant violations, there is no sure way to guarantee that
enforcement can be sought by summary proceedings. The possi-
bility that covenant enforcement may have to be sought through a
non-summary procedure renders the litigation option still less at-
tractive to the lender, makes it less credible as a deterrent, and
reduces even more the creditor's ability to rely on the threat of liti-
gation as a covenant enforcement mechanism.
In addition to exposing the creditor to demands for the deposit of
substantial indemnity and court cost guaranties, the enforcement of
covenants through "after-the-fact-of-violation" litigation-whether or
not it is brought on a summary basis-is costly in terms of the counsel
fees that must be paid. While, in theory, these expenses would be
absorbed by the borrower if the lender prevailed on the merits, the
borrower may well have committed the very negative covenant vio-
lation that precipitated the suit precisely because it was in dire need
of liquid assets. Assuming that most assets of any significant value
would already be mortgaged to the lender, the debtor in the typical
covenant violation situation would in effect be "judgment proof." This
circumstance renders creditor legal fee recovery at best problematic.
This factor, coupled with the fact that in Costa Rica and many other
civil law jurisdictions, counsel fees are set by law and are, by United
States standards, quite high, operates, like the prospect of having to
proceed through a juicio ordinario, to make the litigation option even
less attractive to the lender. The threat of litigation hence becomes
still less credible a deterrent through which to seek covenant en-
forcement.
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Legal fees for the enforcement of loan documentation are, it
should be noted, payable in addition to: (i) the notarial fees which
the lender in all probability has already paid for the inscription of
the documentation in a notary's protocol book; and (ii) the registral
and stamp fees payable for the inscription of mortgages in the ap-
propriate public register. Costa Rican notarial fees are set by Law
No. 39 of January 5, 1943 (La Ley Organica del Notorial), as
amended. Protocolization qualifies an instrument as a "public docu-
ment,"54 which status, as explained above, entitles the holder to pro-
ceed through a juicio efecutivo with the attendant benefits of summary
procedure and exemption from liability for the posting of indemnity
or court cost bonds.5" Registration, as will be discussed in Part VI,
below, renders the document in question effective against third parties.
Both notarial and registral fees are calculable as percentages of the
value of the instrument or action concerned. The notarial and
registral fees for a real property mortgage (hipoteca) or chattel
mortgage (prenda) total approximately five percent; if the financing
is unsecured," the fees applicable to the loan agreement total ap-
proximately one percent.57  For typical loan documentation enforce-
ment proceedings, the legal fees are formidable, ranging, for example,
from approximately two and one half percent of the value of the action
for proving a bankruptcy claim, to more than ten percent for full
prosecution of a juicio ordinario for, e.g., the collection of a money
debt. 8 Moreover, the fees are not, as in some jurisdictions (e.g.,
Nigeria), statutory maximums, but are amounts specified by law whose
54. See note 46 supra.
55. See note 45 supra.
56. If the financing is secured, all salient terms of the loan agreement (re-
payment dates, interest rates, prepayment provisions, affirmative and negative
covenants, and events of default) should and, in the normal course, would be
included in the mortgage which is registered and which would be the document
upon which any collection action in Costa Rica would be based.
57. Specifically, the fee is colons 5012.50 for the first one million colons of
face value, plus .36% of any excess, plus: (a) for a hipoteca, municipal stamps
of .1%, hospital stamps of .2%, and registral fees of .3%, if the term is less than
six years and .4% otherwise; (b) for a prenda, fiscal stamps of .4%, timbres
obreros (labor stamps) of .4%, and a registral fee of .1%; if the prenda is set
forth in the same document as a hipoteca or protocolized loan agreement on
which all applicable fees have been paid, the .4% fiscal stamp charge is waived;
(c) for a protocolized loan agreement, .4% fiscal stamps but, since the agree-
ment is non-registrable, no registral fee.
58, Law 1128, art. 1 provides, in paragraphs A and B, that the fee for
ordinary actions shall graduate from 25% down to 15% for amounts from one to
250,000 colons, and shall be 10% for amounts above that figure (the acdion
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reduction is generally either illegal, or if legal, vigorously resisted by
the local bar.
Proof of Damages
In addition to the lack of injunctive relief and the high legal
costs involved, litigation is a poor deterrent to negative covenant
violation because of the steps the lender must take in order to es-
tablish the quantum of damage he has suffered. There is no doubt
of the lender's right to sue in damages for breach of contract8 The
lender can, however, only comply with code-specified standards of
proof as to the amount of damages if he accelerates the loan and prose-
cutes a collection or foreclosure action through the stages of judgment
and levy on borrower assets, if any, to judicial sale. Estimates of
damages are not admissible. Only when the amount of the actual
proceeds of the sale are known will the lender have satisfactorily
established whether there is in fact any shortfall between amount
due and amount collected, which figure is the only recognized measure
of damages.8 0 Hence, the lender again is placed in the position of
being able to enforce negative covenants only through the initiation
of a legal action which is not only expensive to prosecute, but which
in many instances, will impact adversely on the borrower's ability
to repay the underlying obligation. Additionally, and perhaps most
importantly, it should be noted that in a lending, as opposed to a
pauliana discussed infra is an "ordinary action"); in paragraph D, that in any
other type of action, including collection or foreclosure actions based on titulos
ejecutivos (i.e., juicios ejecutivos), the fee is one-half of that chargeable in a
7uicio ordinario; in paragraph C (covering juicios universales), that fees for filing
a bankruptcy petition are the same as those for a collection action, and that
fees for legalizing a claim in bankruptcy are one-fourth of those for instituting a
juicio ordinario. To fully appreciate the high cost of prosecuting a bankruptcy
action, it should be noted that pursuant to C. Civ. art. 826 and C. CoM. art. 883,
in addition to the foregoing legal fees, a fee of 5% of all amounts actually dis-
tributed must be paid to the court-appointed receiver; and in paragraph I, that
the fee for bringing ancillary actions (actos perjudiciales), such as the petition for
an embargo preventivo, is to be detennined by the agreement of the parties.
59. "In bilateral contracts there is always implicit the condition subsequent
of non-performance. In this case the party which has performed may demand
either performance of the agreement or compensation in direct and indirect
damages." C. Civ., art. 692. Although the explicit wording indicates other-
wise, this section is interpreted as meaning that the party who has performed
may, in the event of the other party's non-performance, request either cancella-
tion and damages, or performance and damages.
60. See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 208(5), which cannot be complied with absent
actual damage.
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construction or sales contract context, there would not be any "dam-
age" unless the borrower had failed to repay, or judicial sale proceeds
had failed to cover, all or part of the amount due. Yet, if the borrower
lacked the funds to pay, or the auctionable assets to cover, amounts
due under the loan agreement, it is unlikely that it would have the
funds or assets with which to respond in damages. Hence, for a
lender, a damage suit in the most likely covenant violation fact
situation would hardly be an efficacious remedy.
Registral Law and Acciones Paulianas
Even if the lender is prepared to rely on the litigation deterrent
for covenant enforcement despite the lack of injunctive relief, the
high bonding and legal costs, and the difficulties of proving damages,
he will probably find that he is able to make out a cause of action
against the borrower only and not against any third party who may
have benefited from the violation. Recourse against the borrower,
however, is likely to be of minimal utility since, as previously noted,
the borrower may well have committed the negative covenant vio-
lation precisely because of its severely-eroded financial position. Thus,
the borrower may be virtually judgment proof by the time the lender
is in a position to initiate litigation.
The probable inability of the lender to bring suit against any
third party benefiting from a covenant violation, and the lender's
consequent inability to effectively deter third parties from participating
in a negative covenant violation by threat of litigation, derives from
two factors. First, two of four Code provisions relevant to the problem
of interference with contractual rights are available only in the context
of a bankruptcy proceeding and are directed toward voiding the
violative act rather than toward obtaining damages from the third
party. Second, while the remaining two provisions require a clear
showing of intent on the third party's part to harm or prejudice the
lender, relevant principles of Costa Rican registral law 6' interpose
substantial obstacles to the making of that showing.
The relevant provisions are Civil Code Articles 848, 901, 905, and
1045. The first three articles provide for the annulment of certain
debtor transactions, while Article 1045 establishes a basis for bringing
61. Registral law consists primarily in C. Civ., arts. 448-79, the Regulations
issued pursuant to C. Civ., art. 458, and C. COM., arts. 19, 20, 22, and 27. For
a detailed description of the civil law registral system and the "principle of
publicity," see Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 464-78.
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an action directly against the parties to such transactions. Articles
901 and 905 list a series of acts which are void if effected while the
borrower is insolvent. Article 901 declares
absolutely void, if performed or executed after the inception of
legal insolvency [as defined in Article 888] ....
1-Any act or contract of the debtor which is either gratuitous
or, if for consideration should be deemed gratuitous with respect to
the excess which the debtor has given over what he has received
in return;
2-The creation of a 'prenda' or 'hipoteca' or any other act or
undertaking intended to secure obligations previously contracted
or to give them any preference over other obligations;
3-The payment of debts not due by reason of the nonexpiration
of their term or the nonfulfillment of a condition precedent to pay-
ment; [and]
4-The payment of due debts not made in cash or in negotiable
commercial instruments.
Article 905 declares
voidable at the demand of the receiver or of any interested credi-
tor, regardless of when effected:
1-Juristic acts or contracts involving simulation, which is
deemed to consist in the affrmation or declaration by the parties
of things or facts which are not true; [and]
2-Any alienations whether gratuitously or for consideration,
when the other party had notice that the debtor performed the
act or entered into the contract in order to withhold the thing or
its value, in whole or in part, from the reach of his creditors.
In that these articles can, by their terms, be invoked only in the
context of a bankruptcy proceeding, they are, in the normal course,
useful to the lender solely as negotiating resources. In this sense,
they are remedies whose invocation can be threatened in an effort to
deter defaulting borrowers and/or beneficiary third parties from
perpetrating or continuing, as the case may be, covenant-breaching
transactions, but whose effectiveness is distinctly limited outside of
an incipient bankruptcy situation.
Article 848 62 provides for the remedy known in civil law as the
62. C. Civ., art. 848 states:
Even if his debt was subject to a condition or had not matured, the
creditor may ask the court to declare ineffective, with respect to him,
the disposition of assets by means of which his debtor prejudices his
rights, under the following conditions:
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accion pauliana5 and is of substantially greater utility than either
Article 901 or Article 905. Unlike those articles, Article 848 can be
invoked outside the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Unlike
Article 901, it is not limited to acts committed after the inception of
insolvency, and unlike Article 905(a), the accion pauliana provided
for by Article 848 is applicable not merely to a few, code-specified
transactions, but to all agreements harmful to the plaintiff's interests,
provided only that the mens rea requirement is met. This latter dif-
ference, e.g., between the right to attack only sham, or simulated,
contracts and the right to attack any prejudicial arrangement, even
one which is otherwise valid, is important to a lender. The difference
was well-explicated by the Supreme Court of Costa Rica in a 1970
judgment:
The Accion Pauliana is initiated to attack a true contract in
which the debtor disposes of property in fraud of his creditors,
where the contract would be valid were it not for the fraud, that
is, if the debtor had other property with which to satisfy his obliga-
tions, while the action for absolute simulation is intended to in-
validate an act or contract which has only apparent existence and
by means of which the relief sought is that the Court declare that
the property has not been transferred and that it still belongs to
the debtor.64
For all of the foregoing reasons, then, a lender seeking to invalidate
a prejudicial transaction would look primarily to the accion pauliana
provided for by Article 848. Yet, despite its seemingly broad sweep,
it should be noted that for an accion pauliana to succeed, the plaintiff
must prove not only that it has actually been harmed by the act
a) that the debtor knew of the prejudice that his act caused to the
rights of the creditor, or, if the said act occurred prior to the inception
of the debt, that it fraudulently intended to frustrate the satisfaction of
the debt; [and]
b) that, in addition, with respect to acts or instruments effected
or entered into for consideration, the third party knew of the injury,
and if the act was effected prior to the inception of the debt, that such
party participated in the fraudulent pre-execution of the prejudicial act.
Satisfaction of a due debt is not subject to revocation.
The ineffectiveness of the act does not prejudice rights acquired for
consideration by third parties acting in good faith, subject to the effect
of the registration of a claim for revocation in the Public Registry.
63. For a detailed discussion of the accion pauliana, see Amos & Walton,
supra note 5, at 243-47.
64. Corte Suprema de Costa Rica, Sentencia No. 22, 14:30 horas, 31 Mar.
1970, Semestre I.
CONTRACTUAL COVENANTS
complained of, but also that, where the transaction was for considera-
tion, there was a "concerted fraudulent intent" on the part of the
debtor and the third party to prejudice the creditor. Particularly
since there will almost always be an "ordinary course" commercial
justification for the transaction between the debtor and the third party,
and because of certain principles of Costa Rican registral law to be
discussed below, conclusive proof of such concert and intent may be
quite difficult to adduce.
The lender seeking .redress against a third party benefiting from
a covenant violation may also consider invoking Civil Code Article
1045-a provision that has a counterpart in virtually every civil code
in the world. Article 1045 states: "[alnyone who through fraud, fault,
negligence or carelessness causes harm to another is liable for the re-
pair of such harm together with indirect damages." The wording
seems straightforward, but proving the requisite intent or negligence
may, as in an Article 848 action, present unusual problems in the
typical lending context.
For example, in one of the Costa Rica work-out situations referred
to in Part IV, the borrower had ostensibly given "Lender A" a first
mortgage on "Parcel A" which was represented by the borrower to
have been carved out of "Parcel B." Subsequently, and in violation
of its loan agreement with Lender A, the borrower proceeded to give a
first mortgage on Parcel B to "Lender B." Because the borrower's at-
torney had failed to comply with certain relevant provisions of the
Costa Rica land transfer law in attempting to create Parcel A out of
Parcel B, Parcel A in fact had no legal existence, and the mortgage
given to Lender B effectively applied to all of the original Parcel B,
including the portion thereof that was to have been Parcel A. Despite
the fact that Lender B had actual knowledge that Lender A believed
that it had a lien on Parcel A, Lender A could not, with any hope of
success, proceed under Article 848 or Article 1045. This resulted from:
(i) the fact that since the land registry entry setting forth Parcel A's
metes and bounds description was legally insufficient, Lender B was
entitled to assert that in taking Parcel B as collateral, it was unaware
that it was also acquiring-or in Lender A's view, usurping-a senior
position with respect to the parcel on which Lender A had expected
to have a first mortgage; and (ii) the difficulty of proving that Lender
B had intended to harm Lender A, as opposed to intending, in the
65. Amos & Walton, supra note 5, at 246.
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exercise of simple commercial prudence, to collateralize its antecedent
debt.
The relevance of register entries and "actual knowledge" derives
from certain principles of Costa Rican registral law. One of the
fundamental features of civil law systems is the so-called "principle
of publicity." The principle states that certain juristic "circum-
stances," such as the existence of interests in real property and chattels,
and the status and capacities of persons and business entities, are effec-
tive as against third parties only if and after they have been inscribed
in the public register concerned with the particular type of juristic
"circumstance" in question, and that agreements and circumstances
which are not so inscribed are ineffective against third parties."
Mortgages, for example, have no effect against third parties until
entered in the Mortgage Section of the Public Register; a company
does not exist as such until the fact and details of its formation have
been entered in the Commercial Register.
A second principle of registral law relevant to the discussion of
enforcement problems is the obverse of the principle of publicity,
namely, the "principle of public faith." In essence, this principle
states that once such juristic "circumstances" as those referred to have
been registered, all third parties are deemed to have constructive
notice of them. 7 An important corollary of the principle of public
faith is that any third party seeking to take advantage of that principle
must have acted in "good faith," i.e., without actual knowledge of
66. See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 455: "Documents which have not been registered
are ineffective against third parties until after the date of their filing with the
Registrar"; C. COM., art. 19: "The charter of a company, modifications thereof;
and dissolution, merger and all other acts which in any respect modify its
structure must be set forth in a public writing, published in extract in the official
gazette and registered in the Commercial Register"; and C. COM., art. 22:
"Until the publication and registration referred to in Article 19 have been effected,
resolutions, agreements and corporate documents are ineffective as against third
parties, and the company founders are jointly liable to such third parties for all
obligations which in such circumstances are contracted in the name of the
company.
67. See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 456:
Registration does not validate registered agreements or contracts
which even though specified by law do not appear in the Register
or contracts which are performed or agreed to by persons who ac-
cording to the Register appear to have the right to do so, once registered
are not invalid with respect to third parties even though subsequently
the right of such person is annulled or dissolved by means of an un-
registered document for non-statutorily specified causes or for causes
which even though specified by law do not appear in the Register
(emphasis added).
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the nonregistered agreement.68 The phrase "good faith" or, in Costa
Rican law, buena fe, is used frequently throughout the Costa Rica
Civil Code, 9 but is never explicitly defined therein. Article 285, how-
ever, states by implication the principle that a party is acting in '%ad
faith," and its actions are, therefore, not "bona fide," if it asserts the
benefit of a registral entry at the same time that it has actual knowl-
edge of a state of facts contrary to those set forth in the entry:
In all cases where the law requires possession to be in good faith,
he shall be deemed a possessor in good faith, who in the act of
taking possession believed that he had the right to such posses-
sion. If he had sufficient reason to doubt that he has such right,
he should not be deemed a possessor in good faith. . . . Possession
shall cease to be in good faith at the moment the possessor ac-
quires the certainty that he may possess improperly.
The essence of the principle of public faith and the effect of actual
knowledge are further elucidated by the following commentary by a
leading civil law scholar:
If a right has been registered .... it is presumed that the right
exists . . . . Similarly, if a registered right . . . has been can-
celled, it is presumed that the right does not exist. . . [but t]hese
presumptions are rebuttable . . . . [E]ntries are deemed correct
unless the [party asserting the benefit of the entry] knows of their
incorrectness. . . . This is often referred to as the rule of public
faith .... It should . . . be noted that it does not require any
reliance on the part of [that party] upon the contents of the [reg-
ister]. The [party asserting the benefit] is protected in any case
in which he did not positively know that the contents of the [reg-
ister] were incorrect. It does not matter whether his ignorance
was due to lack of care. It does not even matter whether he ever
consulted the [register]. Even if he did not know the actual con-
tents of the [register], the latter are treated as if they were cor-
68. While, as discussed infra, this rule is nowhere explicitly stated in the
Codes, it is a cardinal and well-settled principle of civil law. See notes 69 and
70 infra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., C. Civ., arts. 306, 321, 327-29, and 1065. The same principle
of equivalence of actual knowledge of a contrary state of fact with lack of
bona fide, or good faith, status is reflected in the German Civil Code § 892
which states in pertinent part: "[With respect to a person acquiring an interest
in real property,] . . . an entry in the land register is [conclusively] deemed
correct unless an objection to its correctness is registered [therein] or the in-
correctness is known to such persore" (emphasis added).
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rect .... The benefits [of the rule of registral faith] are withheld
from [parties] who ... act in bad faith (emphasis added).10
With respect to business corporations, it is well settled that
among the items of information required to be registered and, hence,
subject to the principle of publicity, and to the rule of public faith
in particular, are:
the legal form under which a business is conducted; all facts per-
taining to its ownership; appointment and removal of agents ex-
ercising managerial functions, as well as limitations upon, and
revocation of, their powers; in the case of a partnership, the names
of the general partners, and the names and liability limits of the
limited partners; in the case of a corporation, the amount of its
capital as well as appointment and removal of officers, and limita-
tions upon, and revocation of, their powers . . . [and the] cessa-
tion or revocation of the powers of [all other] individuals author-
ized to act on behalf of a commercial firm.71
The foregoing principles are relevant to negative covenant enforce-
ment in that they materially restrict the bases upon which suits may
be brought against third parties benefiting from covenant violations.
Clearly, if the circumstance or fact upon which the lender seeks to
rely in its suit is registered, all third parties will be deemed to have
constructive knowledge of it. If, on the other hand, the circumstance
or fact is not registered, a third party may participate in a covenant-
violative transaction without incurring liability to the lender, unless
the lender can successfully invoke the rule of public faith and con-
70. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 467, 469; See also Pacheco, Costa Rica:
Real Estate Purchases by Foreign Investors, TAx MANAGEMENT INT'L J. 2 (De-
cember 1972):
The property books of the Public Register contain all information
about a specific parcel of land which may affect bona fide purchasers.
... Private contracts and guarantees made by the owner of the land
but not entered in the Public Registry will not affect bona fide pur-
chasers. . . . [O]nly those [liabilities] which appear on the registry
entry will affect the bona fide purchaser.... (emphasis added).
See also Rheinstein, Some Fundamental Differences in Real Property Ideas
of the "Civil Law" and the Common Law Systems, 3 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 624, 625,
627 (1936):
[The property register system is] intended not only to simplify the
formalities of land transactions but also to guarantee the utmost security
for bona fide purchasers and mortgagees. Unless . . . notice [of a
secondary heir's interest in a parcel of real property] has been entered
[in the Land Register], bona fide purchasers and mortgagees will ac-
quire good title from the primary heir (emphasis added and footnote
omitted).
71. Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 475-76.
CONTRACTUAL COVENANTS
elusively prove that the third party had actual knowledge of the
violation.
It may appear a relatively trivial exercise to ensure that all nega-
tive covenants are duly registered. Such registration, however, cannot
in all cases be taken as a certainty since it is the practice of some
civil law notaries not to register the entire document (land mortgage,
chattel mortgage, loan agreement) evidencing the lender's obligation.
On the contrary, only such portions of those documents as they con-
sider "vital" will be submitted for registration. Hence, all or a por-
tion of the negative covenant section may be omitted from protocoliza-
tion by a notary who does not consider that portion vital. It is also
not unusual for negative covenant sections to be omitted by inad-
vertence. In either such circumstance, the covenant, since not regis-
tered, cannot be deemed to be within the constructive knowledge of
a third party. For example, in one of the Costa Rica loan work-out
situations which gave rise to the development of the enforcement
mechanisms described below, Lender A had indeed included in its
loan agreement a covenant against mortgaging borrower assets. It
was not the loan agreement, however, but Lender A's mortgage which
was to be registered, and the notary, in drafting the mortgage, had
failed to incorporate therein the negative covenant provisions from
the loan agreement. Consequently, when the borrower, in violation
of the loan agreement, executed a mortgage on certain of its property
in favor of Lender B, Lender A had no cause of action against
Lender B.
VI. Cxrvi LAW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Given the disadvantages of litigating negative covenant violations
in civil law jurisdictions, it is relatively clear that enforcement cannot
be achieved by mechanisms which rely on deterrence, but which leave
the capacity for violation in the borrower's hands. Hence, the en-
forcement mechanisms to be described in this section aim not to
deter the borrower from violating covenants, but: (i) to deprive him
of the legal capacity to do so; and (ii) by this deprivation, to in turn,
render the borrower incapable of validly transferring benefits to third
parties in covenant violative transactions and so create a major dis-
incentive to third party participation in such transactions. Second-
arily, the mechanisms described in this part are designed to ensure
that, in the unlikely event that a violative act were effected and
litigation were to become necessary: (i) the fuicio ejecutivo procedure
would be available so that problems of lack of injunctive relief and
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high bond cost would be minimized; and (ii) problems of proof of
damages would be precluded because of the prior stipulation of the
parties.
The foregoing results are sought to be achieved through four
discrete enforcement mechanisms: (1) the public registration of the
limitation of the capacity of borrower representatives to effect cove-
nant violative transactions; (2) the transfer of voting control of bor-
rower shares to a lender-controlled trustee and the consequent preven-
tion of the revocation of the registered capacity limitations; (3) the
provision to the lender of assured access to the juicio ejecutivo, with
concomitant avoidance of the disadvantages of the juicio ordinario;
and (4) the elimination of the need to prove amount of damages and
the transference of financial liability for violations from the potentially
judgment-proof borrower to the shareholders, directors, and officers
of the borrower-those individuals who would actually have to au-
thorize or effect any violation which did occur.
Elimination of Capacity to Effect Valid Violations
The first enforcement mechanism to be described is the limitation
of the powers of representation of borrower agents so that they lack
the legal capacity to effect covenant violative acts. In turn, any such
acts which were actually committed would be voidable at the request
of, and hence ineffective as to, the lender. The basis of this approach
is Civil Code Article 836 which states, inter alia, that any juristic act
effected by a person who "relatively" lacks the legal capacity to effect
such act is voidable. 72  "Relative incapacity," in turn, is deemed to
arise with respect to a given juristic act when the actor has the
capacity to effect the act subject only to a condition precedent, such
as procurement of the approval of a third party, and the 6ondition
has not been fuffilled.73
72. C. Civ., art. 836 states:
There is a relative nullity and grounds for cancellation of an act or contract:
1. When any of the conditions essential for its formation or its existence
is imperfect or irregular;
2. When any of the requisites or formalities required by law in view
of the exclusive and particular interests of the parties is absent; and
3. When performed or executed by persons of relative incapacity.
73. "Relative [as opposed to absolute] incapacity" is not specifically de-
fined in the Costa Rican Codes. The definition set forth in the text-i.e., that
the phrase refers to the status of a party whose capacity with respect to a
certain juristic act is subject to the approval or confirmation of another party,
which approval or confirmation has not been given-was, however, stated by
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The capacity of an individual to act for a company can derive
from only four sources: particular provisions of the Commercial Code; 4
the company's charter; 75 a delegation of authority set forth in the
charter;76 or a delegation voted by the board of directors. 7 Any such
power of representation, regardless of the source from which it ema-
nates, can be limited by an amendment to the company charter. 8
Such amendments, whether their effect is to add new provisions to
the charter or to delete provisions formerly in force, can be effected
only by resolution of an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders of
the company.79 Given the foregoing principles of commercial law,
limitation of the capacity of borrower agents can be achieved through
the addition of three amendments to the company charter: a "pur-
poses amendment," a "revocation amendment," and a "limitation
amendment."
First, the charter clause, which sets forth the purposes for which
the company was organized, is amended by the addition of the follow-
ing limitation to the standard list of authorized company activities,
such as manufacturing, trading, and investing: 0
Costa Rican counsel consulted by the author to be the standard civil law
definition of relative incapacity.
74. C. CoM., art. 182:
The power of judicial and extrajudicial representation of a company
inheres in the president of the administrative counsel [e.g., board of
directors], as well as the directors indicated by the charter, who hold
such powers as they are accorded therein.
If the charter so permits, the counsel may authorize those representing
the company to delegate, totally or partially, their functions to other
members of the counsel.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. C. CoM., art. 187:
The administrative counsel, or whoever exercises the power of
representation may, among its other powers, appoint functionaries, such
as managers, holders of powers-of-attorney, agents or representatives,
with such titles as are deemed suitable, to carry out the business of the
company or particular aspects thereof and who may or may not be
shareholders.
The functionaries referred to in the preceding paragraph have such
powers as are established by the charter, the by-laws, the regulations
or the respective resolution of appointment.
78. Id.
79. C. COM., art. 156(a).
80. The amendments quoted are English translations of the amendments
actually used in two loan restructuring situations in Costa Rica in 1978 and 1979.
Addition of these amendments is typically achieved by making their enactment
a precondition to drawdown, rescheduling, etc., as the case may be.
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The Company may not, without the prior express approval of the
general shareholders meeting (a) affiliate, merge or consolidate
with any other company or enterprise in law or in fact; (b) ex-
ecute guaranties of any kind; (c) invest in assets of any type not
required for its normal operations; (d) engage in activities dif-
ferent from those set forth in this clause; (e) mortgage, pledge or
in any other manner encumber its assets except in order to guar-
anty a portion of the price of any such asset at the time of pur-
chase, provided that no such purchase money lien shall be granted
with respect to assets acquired from shareholders, affiliates or sub-
sidiaries of the company or from firms controlled directly or in-
directly by such shareholders, affiliates or subsidiaries.
This purposes amendment serves two important functions. First, it
constitutes public notice that covenant-violative acts are ultra 1>ires
as to the borrower; hence, in the event that any such act is sought to
be registered in contravention of the purposes clause, it may well be
refused registration by the Register on ultra vires grounds. Second,
the purposes amendment puts third parties on notice as to the legally-
sanctioned activities which the borrower can and cannot undertake
and hence affords the lender the basis-e.g., the third parties' con-
structive knowledge of the limitations on borrower prerogatives-of a
suit to void any violative transaction on "lack of capacity" grounds.
The two remaining charter amendments are of equally critical
importance. The revocation amendment cancels all outstanding pow-
ers granted by the company up to the time of the amendment, includ-
ing powers granted by the board or otherwise delegated. It does not,
it should be noted, affect powers of representation arising from code
provisions or the charter itself.
The limitation amendment, however, imposes limitations on all
four categories of powers. This amendment is appended to the dec-
laration-standard in virtually all charters-that the company shall be
administered by a board of directors; that it shall have a president
and other officers; that the board may grant powers of all types,8'
revoke them, and grant new powers; that the board may appoint of-
ficers and managers, granting to them such powers as are deemed
convenient; and that the judicial and extrajudicial power of represen-
tation of the company shall inure to the president of the board, who,
in the execution of his duties, shall have all powers conveyed by
81. There are a variety of different types of powers: special, general,
generalissimo, general powers of management, and general judicial powers;
see, e.g., C. Civ., arts. 1253-60.
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Article 1253 of the Civil Code. The amendment first introduces, after
the clauses authorizing the board to grant "powers of all kinds" and
to grant to officers and agents "such powers as may be deemed con-
venient," the statement that "all such powers shall be subject to the
limitations that follow." The amendment then adds the following
paragraph after the reference to Article 1253 of the Civil Code:
The president and vice-president of the board of directors, all
holders of powers of representation, all officers, agents and rep-
resentatives which -have been appointed, are now serving or shall
in future be appointed, the board of directors and the executive
committee shall at all times require the express authorization of
the general meeting of shareholders, granted by final vote: (a)
to invest in assets other than those required for the normal opera-
tions of the company specified in this charter; (b) to engage in
any new line of business; (c) to encumber company assets, other
than to guaranty a portion of the price of any such asset at the
time of the purchase thereof, provided that such asset at the time
of the purchase thereof [sic], provided that such asset has not been
acquired from any shareholder, affiliate or subsidiary of the com-
pany, or from any enterprise controlled directly or indirectly by
any such shareholder, affiliate or subsidiary; (d) to grant loans of
any type to shareholders, officers or employees of -the company,
or to third parties when the total amount of such loans granted by
the company exceeds the equivalent of $50,000; (e) to sell or trans-
fer in any manner assets of the company with a book or market
value, whichever shall be greater, of more than the equivalent of
$250,000; (f) to solicit, contract or undertake agreements or obli-
gations or leases outside the normal course of business, or incur
financial obligations of any type when the total of such obligations
exceeds in any fiscal year the equivalent of $100,000; (g) to make
capital investments or invest in assets in excess of the equivalent
of $250,000 in any fiscal year; or (h) to grant guaranties of any
type. In each instance in which a power is granted or an officer,
agent or representative is appointed, the foregoing limitations
shall be included in the resolution of grant or appointment.
All charter amendments are required by law to be inscribed in
the Commercial Register.82 Once the revocation and limitation amend-
ments have been so inscribed, they constitute constructive notice to
all third parties that the capacity of all individuals holding powers
of representation of the borrower-whether code-granted, charter-
granted, or delegated-to enter into the acts listed in the limitation
82. C. COM., art. 19; see also note 71 supra.
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amendment is merely conditional; that such individuals are, therefore,
under a relative incapacity with respect to such acts; and that, indeed,
no general or generalissimo powers which do not contain the enu-
merated limitations may be granted without shareholder vote-the fact
of which vote, it should be noted, must be registered in order to be
valid."'
In so placing the foregoing legal circumstances in the public
register, the revocation and limitation amendments ensure that any
violative acts effected without the requisite shareholder approval are
voidable under Article 836(3). This, in turn, significantly reduces the
likelihood that a violation would occur since any third party con-
sidering lending to the borrower, taking a mortgage or pledge from
it, accepting the borrower's cross-guaranty, making a payment to the
borrower in exchange for title to borrower assets, or otherwise par-
ticipating in a juristic act prohibited by the lender's negative cove-
nants would, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, be likely to dis-
patch its counsel to check the borrower's entry in the Commercial
Register. It is at this entry that the charter amendments would be
inscribed; it would be this registral inscription which, by the principle
of publicity, would put all third parties on constructive notice of the
limited capacity of borrower agents. Consequently, it would be this
entry which would alert third parties to the fact that the transaction
in contemplation was one which was voidable and consequently, from
its point of view, commercially inadvisable. It is unlikely, therefore,
that third parties would be willing to participate in transactions listed
in the limitations amendment, i.e., the transactions barred by the
lender's negative covenants.
The Voting Trust
Charter limitations on agent capacity are, however, by themselves
not sufficient to ensure that negative covenants will not be violated.
This is so because just as borrower shareholders have the power to
vote the revocation and limitation amendments into the charter, so
under normal circumstances, would they be free to reconvene at any
subsequent time to vote the amendments back out of the charter. If
this occurred, the lender, of course, would find itself precisely where
it was when the deterrent exercise began. Hence, a second enforce-
ment mechanism-the borrower shares voting trust-must be put in
place.
83. C. CoM., art. 235(c).
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Under the voting trust arrangement, the borrower's stock is as-
signed and delivered to a trustee who becomes the record-but not
beneficial-owner thereof, either by virtue of the inscription of his
name on the shares and in the company stock book (for nominative
shares), or by virtue of his physical possession of the shares (for bearer
shares)." The former shareholders are entitled-by the terms of the
trust agreement among the shareholders, the lender, and the trustee-
to submit directions to the trustee as to how the shares are to be voted
on any particular matter. The text of any resolution in favor of which
the former shareholders request the trustee to vote the assigned shares
must, however, be forwarded by the trustee to the lender, and the
trustee is not entitled to accept the former shareholders' voting direc-
tion until and unless the resolution is approved by the lender.s With
84. The following discussion is applicable both to bearer share and to
nominative share corporations. It is strongly recommended, however, that the
lender require that the borrower issue, or, if bearer shares are already out-
standing, convert to nominative shares only. See Keesee, New Challenges to
Investor's Counsel: Legal Risk Analysis and the Work-Out Perspective in LDC
Investment, 5 FEPPEEDiNE L. REv. 305, 339 (1978). Nominative shares and
their transfer are described at C. COM., art. 608, 686-92, and bearer shares
and their transfer are described at C. CoM., art. 668, 712-26.
85. The specific wording of the assignment and vote-limitation clauses uti-
lized in the 1978-79 Costa Rica restructuring situations referred to in Part IV
is as follows:
2. Assignment of Shares
(b) The Assignors [e.g., the former shareholders] hereby irrevocably
transfer all of their right, title and interest in and to the Shares and
to any shares of stock of the Company which they may hereafter ac-
quire (which such future shares, if any, shall also be deemed to be
subsumed by the term "Share") to the Trustee.
(c) The Shares shall be accepted and shall at all times be held by
the Trustee in safe-keeping for the benefit of the Assignors; and the
Trustee shall not sell, transfer, encumber or make any other disposition
of the Shares without the prior written consent of the Assignors and of
the Lender at the expiration of the Term of this Agreement, or (ii)
in the event that the Company is adjudicated a bankrupt and its assets
distributed to its creditors, or (iii) after the Company has been volun-
tarily liquidated, or (iv) in the event of any collection, foreclosure or
other action by the Lender against the Company, which, as certified
to the Trustee by the Lender has resulted in a final settlement of all
Loans and Other Indebtedness as between the Lender and the Com-
pany, then the Trustee shall reassign and deliver the Shares to the
Assignors.
3. Voting Rights
(b) If at any time during the Term of this Agreement an Assignor
wishes to direct the Trustee with respect to any matter to vote the
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the limitations on the powers of officers and the powers that may be
granted by the Board to subsequent attorneys-in-fact, or "mandato-
ries," already amended into the charter, the establishment of the vot-
ing trust subject to lender direction ensures that the erstwhile share-
holders cannot simply reconvene in an extraordinary general meeting
to vote to delete the limitations back out of the charter.86
The voting trust, moreover, has a number of other significant
advantages. Several of the juristic acts, for example, which are typi-
cally barred by negative covenants cannot in any event be effected
by individual officers, but rather must be approved by shareholder
resolution. Among these acts are merger, dissolution, filing for re-
ceivership, and filing for voluntary bankruptcy."' Establishment of
the voting trust with lender control of shareholder votes provides the
lender with the means, which would not be available from the charter
amendment mechanism alone, to prevent those acts from being ef-
fected without lender approval.
Shares transferred by such Assignor hereunder, then no less than 21
days prior to the date of such vote, such Assignor shall deliver to the
Trustee the complete text (the "Text") of the matter with respect to
which the voting direction is proposed to be given; and the Trust shall
within 5 days of his receipt thereof transmit the Text by telex to the
Lender at the notice address set forth in Exhibit E hereto, with a copy
to any Assignor who has not joined in such voting direction. The
Lender shall inform the Trustee by telex no later than 10 days prior
to the date of the vote whether it approves or disapproves of the
Assignor's voting direction with respect to each matter for which direc-
tion is proposed to be given. The Trustee shall not accept the As-
signor's voting direction unless it has been approved by the Lender.
If, as of 5 days prior to the date of vote, the Trustee has not received
a response from the Lender, the Trustee shall by telex request to
convey such response by telex within 48 hours. The Lender covenants
herewith that upon receipt of the aforementioned Trustee telex, it will
inform the Trustee by telex at the Trustee telex address set forth in
Exhibit E, of its approval or disapproval no later than 48 hours prior
to the date of the vote; notwithstanding the foregoing, however, if the
Lender does not so indicate approval or disapproval, it shall be deemed
to have approved.
86. The charter of a sociedad anonima, soci&t6 anonyme, or other analogous
entity can, by the terms of the typical civilian jurisdiction commercial code, be
changed only by resolution of a general and extraordinary shareholders' meet-
ing. See, e.g., C. COM., art. 156. An "extraordinary" general meeting is a
general meeting other than the regularly scheduled "ordinary" general meeting
which convenes annually to approve year-end balance sheets, approve divi-
dends, etc.
87. See, e.g., C. CoM., art. 221 (merger), and C. CoM., art. 855 (voluntary
bankruptcy).
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As do the publicly-registered revocation and limitation amend-
ments, the voting trust constitutes a significant deterrent to third
party participation in violative acts. This results from the fact that
even if the board or an officer of the borrower did issue a power not
limited in conformity with the charter amendments, the lender would
be able to void any act effected by the holder of the power since the
beneficiary of the act would be responsible by the principle of pub-
licity for constructive knowledge of the registered fact that the power
was invalid. Additionally, since the terms of the trust agreement
modify previously registered information bearing on ownership of the
company shares and are, therefore, inscribed in the Commercial Reg-
ister, all third parties are on further notice that all acts requiring
"shareholder" approval must in fact be approved by the trustee.
Three additional positive features of the trust arrangement are:
(1) that since the trust agreement can be protocolized it can form
the basis of a juicio ejecutivo; (2) that since, even with the power of
attorney and charter limitations in place, corporate representatives
retain full power to carry out all functions required in the normal
cause of business, shareholder votes should be required no more fre-
quently than the usual general meeting, and the requirement of telex
preclearance should not be unduly burdensome; and (3) that not only
is the trustee held to a high standard of care in fulfilling his voting
duties,"' but in the normal course, the trustee is likely to be lender's
local counsel and, therefore, particularly non-susceptible to locally-
generated "misunderstandings" or improper influence which could
undermine the lender's control of share voting.
Finally, it should be noted that the trust agreement approach is
dilficult to circumvent. First, it is difficult to envision a situation
wherein a borrower would be able to substitute a "lender approval"
of a voting directive for a "lender disapproval," since the disapproval
would be transmitted in writing-by telex or letter-directly from
lender to trustee. Second, as noted above, the trustee's duty of care
is well elaborated in the codes, the penalties for breach of that duty
severe, and the disincentives to breach multitudinous. Third, it is
highly unlikely that a notary would enter in his protocol book, for
subsequent transcription into the Commercial Register, a statement
that the trustee had appeared before him and voted borrower stock
in a particular way (e.g., in favor of a charter amendment deleting
88. See, e.g., C. COM., arts. 633-62 (note arts. 644 and 645).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
the prior "limitation" amendment, or in favor of a merger or voluntary
bankruptcy) if the trustee had not in fact done so. The registration
of a charter amendment or corporate decision on the basis of such a
protocolized statement of shareholder (e.g., trustee) vote could only
occur if the notary were either defrauded into making the attestation
or himself participated in a fraud. While such eventualities are not
inconceivable, they are relatively improbable. The first scenario is
implausible not only because substantial prison terms are prescribed
as the penalty for defrauding a notary, 9 but also because it is highly
unlikely that given the extent of a notary's code-prescribed duty of
care, he could be deceived into accepting and registering a vote at-
testation not actually made by the trustee." The second scenario is
unlikely both because of the severity of the penalties levied against
a notary who makes a false attestation,9 and because a notary's fraudu-
lent attestation that a trustee had appeared before him at a specified
time and place and made a particular unambiguous statement would
be relatively easy for the trustee to disprove, through, e.g., the testi-
mony of witnesses to his actual whereabouts at such time.
It may be noted for the sake of completeness that at least in
theory, an alternative to the trust arrangement does exist as a safe-
guard against the deletion of the purposes, revocation, and limitation
amendments by subsequent shareholder vote. This theoretical alter-
native consists in the enactment of an additional charter amendment
which provides that no modification of the purposes, revocation, or
limitation amendments would be registrable without the consent of
89. See CODIGO PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 358 (providing a penalty of one to
six years imprisonment for causing the insertion of a false statement in a public
document) and art. 359 (providing a penalty of six to twenty-four months for
falsification of a private document, such as the minute books of a shareholders'
meeting).
90. The civil law notary is under a duty to use the utmost care in ex-
amining the legality, and generally the validity, of the transaction;
this includes, of course, diligent inquiry into the identity and legal
capacity of the parties. If the transaction requires approval by a
third party or by a public authority, he must so inform the parties.
... Intentional or negligent violation of any of these duties may
subject the notary to disciplinary proceedings and to civil liability
for damages. . . . [T]he requirement of notarial form . . [makes
it] more difficult for agents without proper authority . . . to create
the semblance of a valid legal transaction ...
Schlesinger, supra note 4, at 16-17 (emphasis added). See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 629
in text inira.
91. See C. PEN., art. 357, providing a penalty of one to six years for fraud
in the preparation of a public document by a notary in his capacity as notary.
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the lender thereto, in protocolized form and noted in the Commercial
Register.
There is, however, a significant problem with the implementation
of this "lender approval" amendment mechanism. Article 152 of the
Costa Rica Commercial Code states:
The legally convened shareholder's assembly is the supreme au-
thority of the firm, and expresses the collective will on matters
within its competence. Those powers which the law or the char-
ter do not allocate to any other organ of the firm are within the
competence of the assembly.
When registration of the lender approval amendment was sought in
connection with the 1978 Costa Rica work-out, the Office of the Com-
mercial Register interpreted Article 152 as meaning that as the "high-
est corporate authority," shareholders could not agree to auto-limita-
tion, even in connection with a collateralization arrangement. The
argument was made to the registrar that the meaning of Article 152
was not that the shareholders could not contract to forebear from
certain acts for the benefit of third parties, but that as among intra-
firm entities, i.e., the board, the executive committee, individual di-
rectors, the president of the board, officers, and shareholders, the
authority of the shareholders was paramount. This indeed appears
to be the logical interpretation of Article 152 since, in the ordinary
course, shareholders qua shareholders limit the exercise of their rights
by entering into, inter alia, stock retention agreements, voting trust
agreements, and agreements to allow lenders to name board members
in the event of payment default. Typically, such undertakings as
these are accepted by civilian registrars and not attacked as void and
unenforceable, as indeed they would be if they contravened an im-
perative provision of a Costa Rica code, i.e., a provision from which
derogation was not permissible.9" Consequently, it is difficult to ac-
cept the argument that shareholders may not enter into agreements
limiting their use of their shares.
Ultimately, the Costa Rica Registrar's Office revised its interpreta-
tion of Article 152 to allow registration of a lender approval amend-
ment. The issue, however, may be raised in other civil law jurisdic-
92. See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 10: "Neither a general renunciation of the laws
nor a particular renunciation of laws concerned with the public interest is
effective. All juristic acts and agreements against prohibitionary [e.g., im-
perative] laws are null and void unless such laws provide otherwise."
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tions, and the availability of the lender approval amendment mechan-
ism should not be presumed.
Assurance of the Availability of the fuicio Efecutivo
The purposes, revocation, and limitation amendments and the
voting trust agreement are intended, by: (i) depriving the borrower
of the capacity of effect violations; and (ii) creating major disincen-
tives to third party participation in attempted violations, to ensure
that the lender need never resort to litigation to correct covenant
violations. The possibility must not be ruled out, however, that
through bureaucratic error, miscarriage of justice, or other infortuitous
event (as, for example, the inadvertent omission of a portion of the
loan agreement negative covenant provisions from the limitation
amendment), a violation may somehow be effected despite the safe-
guards discussed above and that litigation may become necessary.
Two additional mechanisms can be implemented by the lender
to ensure that if the litigation contingency does so materialize, the
lender will be in the best possible legal position. The first mechanism
is the inclusion in the protocolized loan agreement or mortgage of a
waiver by the borrower of all right to claim that any action based
on the document must be brought as a juicio ordinario because of
alleged ambiguities in the document terms. This waiver, together
with the fact that the loan documentation, the charter amendments,
and the trust agreement are all protocolized and hence, public docu-
ments, should ensure the availability of the juicio efecutivo.
The Penalty Clause
The second "litigation contingency" mechanism is the conclusion
of a "penalty clause" agreement with, as appropriate, shareholders,
officers, and/or directors of the borrower to obviate the problem of
proving the amount of damages resulting from a covenant violation.
Under Article 426 of the Commercial Code, any contract may include
a clause providing for liquidated damages in the event of breach.93
93. C. CoM., art. 426 states:
When a penalty is provided for the non-performance or defective
performance of a contract, except in the case of fraud by the obligor
or an agreement to the contrary, the obligee may demand only the stipu-
lated performance or the agreed upon penalty; but if the penalty is
payable solely in respect of failure to perform within the agreed time
or at the agreed place, the obligor may demand both the penalty and
performance of the contract.
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The obligee can claim either performance or the penalty, and if the
parties specifically so agree, can even claim both. 4  If the parties do
so agree, the penalty that can be claimed in addition to the principal
obligation can be up to twenty-five percent of that principal amount.15
In either case, the obligee is free to sue for consequential damages
arising from a fraudulent breach in addition to any liquidated dam-
ages he collects?
The lender utilizes these principles to deter negative covenant
violation by providing in the agreement that if despite the trust agree-
ment (e.g., by fraud or mistake, or in the event that for any reason the
trust is deemed invalid or unenforceable, as, for example, on the
grounds that it is contrary to public policy): (a) the charter is
amended to revoke or alter the previously enacted purposes, revoca-
tion or limitation amendments; or (b) any act constituting a violation
of the lender's negative covenants is effected by a borrower represen-
tative, then in either such event, the lender will be entitled for each
such breach to a stipulated penalty payment from the obligor under
the penalty agreement.
The obvious advantage of the penalty clause mechanism is that
it eliminates not only the need to establish the amount of damages,
but also the fact that any damages have even been suffered. As Planiol,
perhaps the leading French commentator on the civil law, has ob-
served:
Penalty clauses... [have a double object; first they] serve to over-
come all difficulty as to evaluating the damage suffered by the
creditor and as to the amount of the indemnity which is due him;
they avoid the necessity for a law suit, or at any rate of having an
expert estimate the damage .. .. [Second,] it is not necessary to
inquire whether the creditor has or has not suffered damages as a
result of the inexecution of the obligation .... The agreement as
to a fixed amount was made expressly to avoid all inquiries of such
nature. The penalty is due (and that is one of its great advan-
tages) from the moment that the debtor is responsible for nonper-
formance. 97
94. Id.; C. Civ., art. 711.
95. C. Civ., art. 712.
96. "The penalty clause is effective even if the creditor does not suffer dam-
ages. If the damages exceed the amount of the penalty, the obligee may claim
a greater indemnification only if he proves fraudulent intent on the part of
the obligor." C. Civ., art. 427.
97. M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE Civia LAW 153-55 (11th ed. 1959).
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Beyond the elimination of the need to prove damages, the penalty
clause mechanism provides a second feature of significant value to the
lender: it allows the lender to shift financial liability for breach of a
negative covenant from the borrowing entity to the individual share-
holders, directors, and officers of the borrower-the parties within
whose discretion it is to determine whether a covenant violation will
or will not occur. As summarized by Planiol:
[T]he penalty clause serves to give an action to a person who,
without it, would not have one; that is seen in the case of promises
and stipulations [e.g., by shareholders, officers, etc.] for the benefit
of third parties [e.g., the borrower]. He who promises the act of
another does not promise to do anything personally and conse-
quently, no obligation can arise against him; but it is different if
a penalty clause is added to the contract; he will be obligated to
pay if the third party designated in the act does not do what is
expected of him.98
It should be noted that there would appear to be no question
under Costa Rican law but that an officer, director, or shareholder
may validly contract to be individually liable for the acts of a firm
with which he was associated.99
This personal nature of the obligation allows the lender the op-
tion of collecting the penalty amounts through attachment and sale
of the individual obligor's personal property, and thereby, augments
in two respects the credibility of the lender's threat to litigate in the
event of a covenant violation. First, it eliminates the need for the
lender to move for satisfaction against borrower property whose sale
could materially interfere with borrower operations and loan repay-
ment prospects. Hence, the penalty clause mechanism adds an ele-
ment of "ready invokability" to the lender's litigation option. Second,
the lender is no longer limited to recourse against a borrower which
may be little more than a judgment-proof shell. Again, since litigation
by the lender in these circumstances appears to offer an enhanced
prospect of recovery, lender litigation gains added credibility as a
deterrent.
A problem sometimes encountered with the penalty clause ap-
proach is that shareholders, officers, and directors will resist the as-
sumption of personal liability. This, however, is not a particularly
98. Id. at 153-54.
99. See, e.g., C. Civ., art. 1045-46.
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persuasive ground of opposition, at least with respect to shareholders
and directors, in that lenders frequently require personal guaranties
of company obligations. The execution of the penalty clause agree-
ment simply broadens the scope of the obligors' responsibility to in-
clude not merely breach of the repayment obligation, but breach of
the negative covenants as well.
A theoretical disadvantage of the penalty clause approach is that
the codes of certain civil law systems empower the court in its discre-
tion to reduce the amount of liquidated damages if it appears "proper
to do so." This residual judicial power to interpose the court's judg-
ment in place of the agreement of the parties has, however, been
roundly criticized by commentators, is not permitted in many jurisdic-
tions, and, where permitted, is not widely used.'0°
VII. CONCLUSION
It is not the intention of this paper to arbitrarily adopt a cynical
or misanthropic view of the typical borrower-lender relationship and
then insist upon lender imposition of involuted and draconian methods
as the only means of dealing with the problem. What this paper does
attempt is a demonstration: (1) that negative covenants are of critical,
not secondary, importance in the post-disbursement lending phase; (2)
that because of material variations between common law and civil
law legal principles, the covenant enforcement procedures reflected
and incorporated in a common law jurisdiction lender's loan documen-
tation are likely to be ineffective deterrents to covenant violations in
civil law jurisdictions; (3) that because of the very substantial number
of nations that can be considered civil law jurisdictions, the develop-
ment of enforcement mechanisms that are effective in such jurisdic-
tions is a notably important task; (4) that because of the substantial
common origin of civil law legal systems, a solution to the covenant
enforcement problem developed for one "model" civil law jurisdiction
would have substantial applicability to many others; (5) that Costa
100. See Planiol, supra note 97, at 155-56.
The German... and Swiss Code[s] allow the creditor to obtain greater
damages if he can prove a greater prejudice, and the debtor can ob-
tain a reduction if the indemnity is excessive in comparison to the harm
done. This provision, based on equity, takes away from the penal
clause almost all its usefulness. The project [sic; should be translated
as "draft"] of the Franco-Italian Code of Obligations (Article 101)
retains the principle that the penalty clause cannot be modified by the
judge. The Brazilian Code of 1916 (Article 927) does the same.
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Rica well qualifies as such a "model" jurisdiction; and (6) that, predi-
cated on the analysis of specific provisions of the laws of Costa Rica,
there are four primary enforcement mechanisms-charter amendments,
the voting trust, waiver of juicio ordinario, and the penalty clause-
which effectively ensure the enforceability of negative covenants in
civil law jurisdictions.
To the extent that the foregoing points appear to have been ade-
quately demonstrated, it is further urged that U.S. counsel to lenders
investing in civil law jurisdictions owe a duty to their clients to make
an independent review of the validity of the mechanisms discussed
above and, if satisfied of their effectiveness, take steps to see that they
are implemented for their clients' benefit. Finally, to take a larger
view, it may be observed that few issues point up as well as the
matter of negative covenant enforcement the critical need for U.S.
lenders' counsel, if their clients are to be properly served, to have the
most extensive familiarity possible with the foreign legal systems in
which their clients operate.
